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The cutting of the Isthmus of Central America had 
been the dream of navigators from the time it was discovered 
that nature had failed to provide a passage from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific Oceans without making the long voyage around 
Cape Horn. The feasibility of such a project was recognized 
as early as the first part of the sixteenth century. How-
ever, it was more than 400 years before the undertaking was 
begun and finally completed after long, tedious, and often-
times exasperating negotiations. 
The completion of the canal across the Isthmus of 
Panama fulfilled the dreams of the preceding centuries. The 
story of Panama is replete with heroes and villains. Many 
will consider certain individuals the heroes while others 
will consider the same as the villains. Debates will continue 
as long as ethics and international law are argued. As long 
as people are able to form their own opinions and conclusions, 
it is doubtful whether or not a definite conclusion will ever 
be reached concerning the ethics employed by the United 
States in obtaining the canal. 
President Theodore Roosevelt claimed that every step 
of the way was carried out with the highest, finest, and 
nicest standards of public and international ethics. 
Phillippe Bunau-Varilla termed the long struggle as a war 
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for Truth, Justice, and National Interest. To critics of 
these individuals these views would signify that both were 
suffering from self-hypnosis. To their apologists these 
opinions could be defended on the grounds that interests of 
collective civilization should take precedence over the 
interests of any one country. By assuming this argument it 
must be admitted that there is an international eminent 
domain. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to draw a 
definite conclusion as to whether the course of action taken 
by the United States should be justified or condemned. I 
have attempted to trace, in a cursory manner, the events 
leading to the Panama Revolution; and the subsequent signing 
of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. Thi s treaty cleared the 
way for the beginning of the construction of the Panama Canal 
by the United States and established a protectorate over the 
republic of Panama, which was contrary to the established 
principles of the United States, and continued in effect 
until 1939. Relations between the United States and Panama 
have often become strained and vexatious since that time, 
however, I have used this date as a convenient stopping 
point. 
Research was confined primarily to the American State 
Papers, Foreign Relations; Archives of the United States, 
State Department, Diplomatic Instructions to Colombia and 
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Notes to Foreign Legation, Colombia; Diplomatic History of 
the Panama Canal, Senate Document 474; and The Debates and 
Proceedings of the United States. 
To completely exhaust the materials relative to this 
subject would require more time than was available for this 
study. No definitive conclusions can be made until the 
papers of William Nelson Cromwell, the New York attorney who 
represented the interests of the French Panama Canal Company 
in this country, are made available. As it is doubtful 
whether or not they will ever be published, it is only possi-
ble to surmise the part played by this controversial figure. 
Acknowledgment is made to Dr. Eugene R. Craine, whose 
helpful suggestions, patient proofreading, and critical 
analysis has helped immeasurably in t ~e completion of this 
study. 
Special acknowledgment is made to my wife, Lynnette, 
who proofread, typed the initial copies, and made many 
helpful suggestions while the first draft was being prepared. 
CHAPTER I 
LOOKI NG INWARD 
The American people have always felt themselves 
destined for high purposes. From early colonial times the 
New England communities believed that, more than anyone else, 
they were destined to occupy and preserve a small section of 
the world where those of like religious faith and practice 
could realize, without governmental interference, their re-
ligious ideals. These ideals were followed while the New 
England colonies were still included in the British colonial 
system. There were few who considered separate existence 
from England, and it was not until shortly before the War of 
Independence that there slowly develop£i a gener al concep -
t ion of government different from that of England. Even 
aft er the war there existed t he belief that the future wel-
fare and prosperity of the new republic was dependent on the 
Old World. It was not until after the War of 1812 that the 
American people turned their attention upon their own national 
domain. 
As national consciousness grew, it became necessary to 
develop a heritage to supplement this feeling of predesti-
nation. A militant patriotism came to reinforce this sense 
of national function which became identified with the cause 
of civilizationo It was only natural that this patriotism 
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pictured Great Britain as the hereditary foe and the stories 
of valor and suffering came to be identified with the only 
nation that the new United States had fought before 1846. 
The period from 1830 to 1860 is usually regarded as 
that in which the ideal of "manifest destiny" most affected 
our history. The height of this period was the "roaring 
forties," a decade so designated because it was during this 
period that "the spirit of American life rose into high and 
turbulent flame" and "there was welded an association of two 
ideals which gave a new integration to the American con-
sciousness of national destiny."A During the early years of 
the republic, the term "manif'est destiny" vaguely expressed 
the sense of the American people that their form of govern-
ment proved to the world that the principles of a democratic 
government could be successful and "there was a genera l be-
lief that democracy was expanding as well as national 
boundaries."2 This ideal was the driving force behind the 
expansionist movement while the central implication of mani-
fest destiny in the forties was less a matter of scope than 
it was of purposeo 
This purpose was the conception of expansion as a 
1 Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press, 1935), p. 100. 
2 Ephriam Douglass Adams, The Power of Ideals in .Amer-
ican History (New Haven! Yale University Press, 1926)-;-po 67. 
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fulrillment of a certain social ideal, the preservation and 
perfection of which was the providential mission or destiny 
of the American people. This ideal, conceived as being "the 
last best revelation of human thought," was democracy. The 
theory of democracy as implied by the individual of the 
forties was one of mass sovereignty in which the individual-
istic values were summarized by the inspiring word ":freedom." 
The relationship between the social ideal and individual 
:freedom caused the expansion movement to become manifestly 
a destiny. 
Although the championship of the rights of man had 
appeared from the beginning of national consciousness and 
more concretely in the Declaration of Independence, the 
necessity for expansion had not seemed to be an element in 
the national purpose. Expansionists of the revolutionary 
period had offered "liberty" to the "oppressed" Canadians, 
and Thomas Jefferson once included not only Canada but also 
Cuba. and Florida in "America 1 s empire :for liberty. 11 Yet in 
these instances the extension o:f democracy was neither a 
primary motive to any o:f the expansionists nor even a second-
ary motive to many. It was not until the forties that the 
popular ideology of expansion beca:me centered in Democracy. 
Early explanation for the expansionist movement came 
:from writers who were close to the passions of the Civil War. 
These writers were prone to attribute it to "the glut of our 
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slaveholders" and their desire to extend slave territory. 
However, those further removed from the Civil War were more 
objective in asserting that, although expansionism was due 
partly to sectional interests, it was primarily the out-
growth of nationalistic attitudes resting not only on 
practical interests but also upon the "emotion of manifest" 
destiny and its correlate, the "idealism of the spirit of 
democracy. 113 
After several decades of lying dormant, expansionism 
was brought to the attention of the American people by the 
issues of Texas and Oregon and was stimulated by the 
demagogic conduct of the Democratic campaign of 184-!J_. The 
concept of a nation stretching over the entire continent 
began to rise . " • •• by 1830 there had been added the in-
spiration of nationality, the two operated to create a new 
element in manifest destiny, and that new element was 
territorial expansion--a continent-wide national destiny. 114 
The phrase "extension of the area of freedom" came 
into prominence with its use by those expansionists inter-
ested primarily in the annexation of Texas. However, the 
phrase signified extension of freedom regardless of political 
motives . The chief method of extending freedom was by 
3 Ibid., P • 93 . 
4 Ibid., P • 65. 
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passively radiating democratic influences through impressive 
examples. Thomas Jefferson spoke of America as "a standing 
monument and example" which would "ameliorate the conditions 
of man over a great portion of the globe. 11 5 Jefferson 
suggested another method of extending freedom without ex-
pansion. This would be by the migration of pioneers as far 
as the western coast by "free and independent Americans, un-
connected with us but by the ties of blood and interest, 
and employing like us the rights of self-government. 116 Such 
utterances made it clear that Americans perceived no logical 
relationship between the extension of democracy ~nd the ex-
tension of the national boundaries. 
The years following America's first acquisition of 
territory, the Louisiana purchase of 1803, witnessed the 
gradual dissipation of the apprehensions of the anti-
expansionists. The first to pass was the notion that an 
excess of territory would destroy the union. Jefferson's 
inaugural address of 1805 reminded those once fearful of 
Louisiana that" • •• the larger our association the less 
will it be shaken by local passion. 117 There would always 
5 Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 
ed. A. A. Lipscomb (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
Association, 1904- 05), X, P • 217. 
b Ibid., P • 103 
7 James Do Richardson,! Compilation of the Messages 
of the Presidents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
TI3"9TI, I, P • 379. 
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be local passion to disturb the peace of a particular lo-
cality, but in the years following the War of 1812 there was 
an increasing popularity for the view that the United States 
government was based upon a distinct principle of federation, 
dividing power between state and federal government in a 
manner safe and efficacious for both. 
After being cold to the sufferings of Texas for seven 
years, the Americans quite spontaneously developed an over-
whelming desire to enfold the Texans within their protective 
democracy. Such a conception as this was difficult to accept 
bec5use the expansionists themselves made no pretension of 
lllldiluted altruism. On the other hand, to suppose that the 
democratic ideology was merely a hypocritical grace which 
would ease the conscience of the land-hungry Americans would 
be llllwarranted cynicism. The truer motives for expansion 
probably lay with the definite international development. 
There were suddenly placed on America's political horizon 
new problems which brought into play the spirit of democracy 
as well as other motives for expansion. 
In Texas, California, and Oregon the ambitions or the 
intrigues of European powers seemed to the dominant political 
generation of Americans to threaten not only economic and 
strategic interests but also the security of democracy. It 
may be said that the expansionism of the forties arose as a 
defensive measure against the encroachments of Europe in 
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North America, and the conception of an "extension of the 
area of freedom" became general as an ideal of preventing 
absolutist Europe from lessening the area open to American 
democracy. Extension of the area of freedom was the defiant 
answer to the extension of the area of absolutism. However, 
the simple, if brutal, truth is that no virile nation will 
forego its vital interests if it has the power to enforce 
them. "Force has always been the final and ultimate arbiter 
of international relations in modern society. 118 
The view that European interference on the North 
American continent menaced American democracy apparently 
rested on three principal grounds: (1) the belief that what-
ever threatened American security was a danger to the 
political principle which the nation embod i ed; (2) the sup-
position that irrespective of strategic menace, European 
absolutism would pollute American democracy by its very 
contiguity; and (3) the most influential, perhaps, was the 
recognition that adjacent European powers threatened the ex-
tension of American democracy--an ideal which was made more 
precarious by this menace. 9 
Whereas it had once been feared that the Union was 
8 Morris Zucker, The Philosophy of American History, 
Periods in American History (New York: The Arnold-Howard 
Publishing Company, 1945), P• 441. 
9 Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, P• 112. 
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jeopardized by expansion, it was now felt that failure to 
expand through the annexation of Texas would imperil the 
nation. The South had long desired to extend the national 
domain into the Southwest. As early as 1805, a proposal was 
made by Jrunes Madison as Secretary of State to offer 
$5,000,000 for the purchase of Florida and Texas up to the 
Colorado River. The southern states now held that it was 
necessary to obtain Texas for their economic prosperity, 
the continuance of slavery, and the maintainence of a 
balance of political power with the North. 
As is customary in such matters, legal clains to 
possession were advanced to pave the way for renunciation 
by purchase or otherwise. There are those who bemoaned what 
they were pleased to call the 11 rape of Mexico," yet the fact 
remains"• •• that only the American nation was in the 
possession of the wealth, the people, and the initiative to 
settle upon and develop the vast Southwest. In one way or 
another the United States was to inherit it, and so finally 
it did. 11 10 
A second line of thought gives the impression that to 
many the chief consideration was not the Union but the in-
dividual states. It was originally the fear of the New 
lO Zucker, The Philosophy of American History, Periods 
in American History, p. 441. 
,, 
10 
the general land-hunger which caused the pioneer to become 
not a deviation from but the very expression of Americanism.ll 
"Providence had given to the American people a great and 
important mission ••• to spread the blessings of Christian 
liberty. 1112 
The western portion of the North American continent 
was divided into four geographical, political, and inter-
national blocks: Texas, New Mexico, California, and Oregon. 
The names and boundaries of these territories were used in 
what might be called the ordinary geographical sense and not 
accurately descriptive of political countries at any one 
time. 13 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this 
entire extent of land belonged to or was claimed by Spain 
so far as it had been claimed or owned by anyone. Within 
these general boundaries was located the urndian Country" 
which comprised the area presently included in the states of 
Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and to a certain extent the 
Dakotas. These areas were invaded by the pioneers and the 
resistance they met was as a rule overcome on their own 
initiative and created no serious international block. 
11 Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, P• 116. 
12 Senator Buchanan, Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 
1st Sess., P• 380. 
13 Edward Channing,! Histor~ of the United St ates 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, l 2'IT, V, P• SOI. 
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Toward the end of the eighteenth century, British 
and American fur traders anchored along the coast and began 
commerce with the Indians. The Russians, crossing the 
Behring Strait, had likewise entered into the fur trading 
business and had founded stations at various places along 
the coast. In 1790, by the Treaty of Nootka Sound, the 
Spanish abandoned some of their pretensions to Great Britain, 
but the terms of the relative treaty were so obscure that 
they gave to England only vague rights of trade. With the 
purchase of Louisiana in 1803, the United States gained a 
claim to the westward tributaries of the Mississippi River, 
for the French bishopric of Louisiana was claimed to extend 
to the Pacific Ocean. The American claim might be further 
strengthened by the French fur traders who had penetrated 
the territory establishing loose claims which were trans-
ferred to the United States in 1803.14 
Both the United States and Great Britain had valid 
claims to the Oregon territory, but they overlapped to such 
an extent that a line of demarcation was difficult to estab-
lish. The control of the Columbia River and the territory 
that drained into it were the main points of contention. 
Great Britain hoped to establish a line south of the 49th 
14 Channing,! History of the United States, Vol.VI., 
P• 503. 
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parallel both east and west of the Rocky Mountains. The 
United States was disposed to let the Oregon boundary ques-
tion wait in view of the negotiations in progress concerning 
the northeastern boundary. The dispute was, therefore, post-
poned by the joint-occupation agreement of 1818 which was to 
last for ten years. 
This joint occupation by England and the United States 
presented no great problems until "the lands were claimed by 
bands of immigrants swarming into the country in the 40 1 s. 1115 
Negotiations for a settlement were finally taken up in 1844, 
but as Secretary of State John c. Calhoun refused to sur-
render the claim to the valley of the Columbia River, they 
were soon discontinued. 
While the negotiations were in progress, the presi-
dential campaign of 1844 between James K. Polk and Henry 
Clay was in full swing. In view of repeated offers by 
America to accept the 49th parallel for a boundary, Candi-
date Polk's new claim of 54° 40 1 was obviously extravagant. 
Polk himself did not claim this extensive territory until 
his offer, which was much less conciliatory than that of 
Tyler and Calhoun, was rejected. He then fell back on his 
original demand of all of Oregon, and the Democrats conducted 
i5 Louis Martin Sears, A History of American Foreign 
Relations (New York: Thomas Yo-Crowell C.ompany, 1927), P• 246. 
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their campaign under the slogan "Fifty-four Forty or Fight. 11 
Since England persisted in refusing to accept the 49th 
parallel, there was nothing left to do but to seize all the 
territory and fight if England so desired. 
In view of the platform on which Polk was elected, 
the paragraph of his inaugural address treating with this 
question was not as forceful as expectedo He did maintain 
that it would be his 
••• duty to assert and maintain by all constitutional 
means the right of the United States to that portion of 
our territory which lies beyond the Rocky Mountains. 
Our title to the country of Oregon is "clear and un-
questionable," and already are our people preparing to 
perfect t~~t title by occupying it with their wives and 
children • .1.b 
In his annual message of December 2, 1845, Polk re-
viewed the controversy, and after emphasizing the repeated 
offers of the United States to compromise on the 49th paral-
lel, he asked Congress for authorization to end the joint 
occupation after the twelve-month notice. The resolution 
was submitted to Great Britain in a courteous manner in order 
to leave the door open for further negotiations. Polk let 
it be known that any further proposal must come from England 
and that it would be submitt ed to the Senate for ratifica-
tion before he would approve it. 
16 Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages of the 
Presidents, IV, p. 381: - --
The proposal of Great Britain divided the territory 
along the 49th parallel to the Straits of Fuca and along the 
straits to the ocean thus retaining Vancouver Island for 
England. The treaty was approved by the Senate in the exact 
form proposed by Great Britain. Polk was greatly relieved 
at having the dispute settled as war had been declared with 
Mexico over Texas, and there was danger of British inter-
ference either in Mexico or California. 
Prior to 1823 there had been, at the most, three 
thousand white people in Texas. Otherwise its prairies and 
richly wooded river valleys were left to Indians. "Sooner 
or later it was inevitable that the land-hunger of the 
Anglo-Saxons ••• should be attracted into this inviting 
vacuum. 1117 The inevitable influx came when, after the es-
tablishment of the Mexican Republic, Stephen Austin obtained 
a grant of land in Mexico and the right to people it with 
colonists. The settlers were to pay only a nominal price 
for the land but were to assume all the responsibilities of 
Mexican citizenship. Within ten years Texas had a white 
population of from twenty to thirty thousand. The colonists, 
"• •• the Mexican federalists believed, would act as a 
i7 Henry Ba.rnf'ord Parkes,! History of Mexico (Boston! 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 200. 
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barrier against annexation by the United States. 1118 
Friction between the two races soon developed. A 
minor rebellion in the town of Nagodoches showed the Mexican 
government their blindness in permitting the Anglo-Saxons to 
settle . Instead of being a barrier to annexation, it became 
evident that it was an advance guard. Joel Poiensett had 
tried to purchase Texas, and many Americans were known to 
regard the territory as rightfully theirs. In 1828 the 
former insurgent leader of Mexico, Mier y Teran, was sent 
on an inspection trip to Texas and recommended that American 
influence should be immediately checked. 
In 1830 it was decreed that no more colonists could 
be admitted from the United States and that custom duties 
should be collected along the Louisiana frontier. The 
Texans greatly resented these measures because u ••• Texas, 
New Mexico, and California belonged economically to the 
United States and not to Mexico. 019 Constant political up-
heavals, continuing lack of money, and the lack of any real 
patriotic impulse made it impossible to govern effectually 
the territory of Texas. It would be very difficult for 
Santa Anna, then dictator of Mexico, to lead an expedition 
to suppress any rebellion and to send a rival in command 
1L8 Ibid. , p . 200 . 
19 Channing, A History of the United States, p. 525. 
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would only invite revolution. However, possibly mindful of 
the need to do something to save his position, he organized 
and led an army to subjugate Texas. 
By the middle of April, 1836, the Mexicans had over-
run the Texo-American settlements as far as Galveston Bay. 
Santa Anna, believing the rebellion crushed, entertained 
thoughts of returning to Mexico to deal with his domestic 
political enemies. However, a few days previous to the 
Mexican victory at the Alamo, a declaration of Texan inde-
pendence was drafted at Washington-on-the-Bra220s; David 
Burnet was made provisional president and Sa.m Houston mili-
tary commander. Houston ordered a retreat, and for the next 
four months the entire population of Texas was flying east-
ward with the Mexican army in four squadron s following, 
confident that all resistance was at an end. The two armies 
met at San Jacinto, and on April 21 the Texans surprised the 
Mexican army, defeated it, and captured Santa Anna. 
The battle of San Jacinto ended the war, but it did 
not settle the status of Texas. The question then assumed 
the dignity of a world problem, for it included not only 
Texas, Mexico, and the United States but also England, France, 
and Germany, England did not care to see the wealth, area, 
and population of the United States increased to such an 
extent by a possible annexation of Texas; she feared that 
Mexico, where she had large interests, would be subjected to 
17 
the danger of absorption by the United States once her hold 
on the Gulf Coast was assured. If Texas were to adopt 
cotton as her chief erop, she would probably adopt a free 
trade policy thus creating a new market for British goods. 
Once the goods reached Texas, it would be an easy matter to 
smuggle them across the border into the United States free 
of custom duties. France was also desirous of keeping Texas 
an independent republic not only for the material benefits 
to be derived but also--and what was more important--for the 
continuance of the good will of England. 
Upon winning independence from Mexico, it was not 
long before a Texas movement for annexation to the United 
States was under way. This was vigorously opposed by many 
in the United States on two principal grounds. First, it 
would mean the extension of slavery to a vast territory and 
second, Congress did not have the constitutional authority to 
annex an independent republic. 20 The people of Texas were 
by this time in overwhelming majority in favor of annexation, 
and the election of Polk as president in 1844 was a clear 
indication of the feeling of the people in the United States. 
The general feeling that Texas"• •• possessed as it was by 
a:. population which was in truth but a colonial detachment 
20 Zucker, The Philosophy of American History, Periods 
in American History, p,. 442. 
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from our own, and which was still bound by myriad ties of 
the very heartstrings to its old relation, domestic and 
political, their incorporation into the Union was not only 
inevit~ble, but most natural, right, and proper thing in 
the world. "21L . . "Finally the delicate scruples of both 
sides yielded to the irresistable appeal of such an enormous 
accretion to the Union. 1122 In his annual message of 
December, 1844, President Tyler made the proposal that Texas 
be annexed by a joint resolution. The resolution was passed 
in the House of Representatives in January, 1845, and in 
the Senate in March. 
The Mexican government, feeling that both honor and 
national independence must be vindicated, had repeatedly 
declared that annexation of Texas would mean war with the 
United States. Moreover, as the Mexicans had correctly 
anticipated, the United States would not be content with 
Texas; she would also want California. The president of 
Mexico, Jose Joaquin Herrera, informed President Polk that 
a commissioner would be accepted to discuss a settlement. 
Polle promptly nominated John Slidell as minister. The 
21L John L. O'Sullivan, "Annexation," The Shaping of 
the American Tradition, ed. Louis M. Hacker (New York: 
Co:tumbia University Press, 1947), P• 566. 
22 Zucker, The Philosophy of American History, Periods 
.!!}; American History, P• 442. 
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difference between a minister and a commissioner seemed 
meaningless to Poll:, but to Mexico it meant the difference 
between admitting that Mexico had never been wronged and 
resuming ordinary diplomatic relations. Slidell was refused 
recognition; Polk prepared for war. American troops were 
already in Texas under the command of Zachary Taylor. They 
were ordered into the area between the Nueces and Rio Grande 
Rivers. When they met resistance by the Mexican army, Polk 
asked for a declaration of war which was given with but 
minor opposition. 
The Mexicans did not hold a high opinion of the mili-
tary prowess of the American army; European statesmanship 
was inclined to agree with this judgment. The European 
statesmen were, therefore, 11 •• • considerably startled and 
chagrined that the Americans were uniformly successful in 
achieving their purpose. 1123 With the fall of Mexico City, 
the way was clear for a dictated peace, so Americans Trist 
and General Winfield Scott, in accordance with instructions 
previously given them, proceeded to negotiate a peace. 
Mexico was to cede Texas and California and the vast territory 
between--more than half the entire territory of the Mexican 
Republic. $15,000,000 were to be paid in caEh as a balm for 
23 Zucker, The Philosophy of American History, Periods 
in American History, P• 447• 
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her wounds. 
On March 10, 1848, the Treaty Guadalupe Hidalgo was 
ratified by the Senate. Three years later an additional 
strip of territory was purchased along the southern border 
of New Mexico and Arizona thus rounding out our national 
borders and permitting the Americans once more to look in-
ward to develop the land they had acquired on their mission 
to "entend the area of freedom". It was something more, as 
Herbert Ingram Priestly characterized it., than "a biological 
phenomenon."24 "By every standard ••• it can be demon-
strated that historically the spread of the United States 
to the Pacific was justified by the demands of its geog-
raphy, its economy, and from the standpoint of the highest 
national interests of that period in our development. 1125 
24 Charles Austin and Mary Beard, The Rise of American 
Civilization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19Jo'T, VQl. III, 
P• 609. 
25 Zucker, The Philos~ of American History, Periods 
in American History, p. 4480 
CHAPTER II 
CLEARING THE WAY 
The settlement of the Oregon boundary dispute and the 
acquisition of Texas and California solved two serious diplo-
matic problems and completed our national boundaries. How-
ever, while the American people derived a certain amount of 
satisfaction from their accomplishments, the newly acquired 
territory introduced a third problem, more complicated and 
difficult to settle. 
The California gold discoveries in the 1840 1 s pro-
duced the demand for a more satisfactory route across the 
country than the ox-team journey over the plains or the long 
trip around Cape Horn. More important and of lasting con-
sideration, however, w~s that from the standpoint of national 
defense"• •• California and Oregon were distant overseas 
colonies. Pending construction of a trans-continental rail-
road, there could be little overland connnunication between 
the Mississippi Valley and the Pacific Coast.nl. The problem 
of defending two widely separated coast lines on two oceans 
stimulated the demand for a larger navy and agitation for a. 
trans-isthmus canalo 
Harold and Mar~aret Sprout, The Rise of American 
Naval Power 1776-1918. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1946), P• 127 . 
22 
The shortest line of communication to the west coast 
by a canal was via Central America. However, this route 
crossed alien territory over which Great Britain exercised 
large, if not paramount, influence. Equally unsatisfactory 
was the long voyage around Cape Horn notorious for its 
length, perils, and hardships; and possibly more distasteful 
was the fact that this route passed over a long stretch of 
the Atlantic Ocean which was indisputably under the domi-
nation of Great Britain. 
The strategic importance of the Caribbean Sea and the 
Gulf of Mexico to the United States, dating from the 
Louisiana Purchase of 1803, had increased rapidly with the 
settlement of the Mississippi Valley and the consequent 
growth of commerce through the port of New Orleans. These 
waters acquired even greater importance with the close of 
the Mexican War, for any route across the Isthmus must neces-
sarily terminate along the coast which fronted on these 
waters. In the event of the cutting of a canal these water-
ways would become highways of commerce as the trade potential 
of the Fa~ East was becoming recognized. 
This growing demand for a canal across the Isthmus did 
not develop overnight, nor was it caused entirely by the 
growth of American commerce. The construction of such a 
canal had been the dream of navigators and engineers from 
the time it was discovered that nature had failed to provide 
23 
a convenient passage through the Isthmus. Spanish navi-
gators were probably the first to recognize the feasibility 
of such an undertaking. However, the difficulties proved 
greater than first sight indicated. 
The physical and engineering difficulties were in 
themselves problems that would cause hesitation even among 
the most courageous. The reports of the surveying companies 
which had been authorized by Congress to investigate the 
possibilities of a canal route generally favored the 
Nicaraguan route. The length of this proposed route would 
have been 170 miles; however, Lake Nicaragua is forty-eight 
miles wide with the San Juan River flowing from its south-
western corner to the Atlantic Ocean. There were serious 
objections to this route based on the lack of good harbors 
at either end thus making necessary construction of immense 
breakwaters and extensive dredging of the delta at Grey-
town.2 Even with these objections the route was still more 
favorable than the alternative route through Panama. 
The Panama route from Colon on the Atlantic Ocean to 
Panama on the Pacific was about fifty miles in length; how-
ever, the natural elevation was nearly double that of 
Nicaragua. There were natural harbors at each end which 
would accommodate the heaviest shipping. There were, how-
2 John Holladay Latane and David w. Wainhouse, A 
History of American Foreign Policy (New York: The Odyssey 
Press, 1"940), p. 306. 
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ever, certain disadvantages to this route: (1) the un-
healthy climate of this vicinity made labor scarce and in-
efficient; (2) the heavy rainfall averaged ten to twelve 
feet per year at Colon; and (3) the geological structure 
through which the cut had to be made was treacherous. 
Formidable as the physical difficulties may have 
seemed, there was little doubt that they could not be over-
come. The diplomatic complications, on the other hand, were 
not such that they could be readily settled. The weakness 
of the Spanish-American states and their inability either to 
construct or protect a canal created grave international 
problems. To meet these difficulties three plans were suc-
cessively developed. The first called for the construction 
of a canal by a private corporation under international 
control . The second proposed that the cana l be constructed 
by a private corporation but controlled by the United States 
Government . The third plan, which was ultimately used, in-
dicated that the canal be constructed, owned, and operated 
by the United States . 
The last of these three plans was naturally much pre-
ferred in the United States. However, there were serious 
obstacles in the path of putting this plan into operation. 
If the proposed plan of cutting through Nicaragua were to be 
used, there would be the British influence in that area to 
contend with. For more than a century before the American 
Government came into existence, the subjects of Great 
Britain had been actively interested in Central America. 
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By various and fluctuating degrees the British Government 
had managed to gain a dominant control in this area, and as 
a consequence there developed a close relationship between 
England and the Central-American states. It was this time-
honored connection with the Isthmus that made subsequent 
British-American relations so complicated and difficult to 
adjusto 
Before Polk's presidency the United States paid little 
attention to the British encroachments in Central America. 
The British influence was begun in Belize along the southern-
most eastern shore of the Yucatan peninsula. Under treaties 
with Spain in 1713, 1786, and 1844, Great Brit ain was given 
the right to colonize between the Sibern and Hondo Rivers 
for the purpose of cutting and taking out logwood; the 
sovereignty remained with Spain. With the successful revolt 
and subsequent declaration of independence by the Central-
American states, the British colonists ignored the protests 
of these republics, and by 1836 they were claiming the 
Saratoon River as their southern boundary thus doubling their 
area. Two years later the British Government took over the 
Honduran Islands of Ruatan in the Bay group and at the further 
expense of the Central-American states established a pro-
tectorate over the Mosquito Indians along the eastern shores 
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of Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and New Granada. 
These events occurred more than a dozen years after 
President James Monroe uttered the words given to American 
heritage under the title "Monroe Doctrine" which were to 
become a vital part of .American foreign policy. These few 
phrases became the guiding light of future presidents and 
secretaries of state; in them the American people gained a 
sense of security from the follies of Europe. 
"The history of the Monroe Doctrine shows plainly 
enough that its authority depends upon what force the United 
States can use to back it up. 11 3 For many years after 1823 
the United States had no power to spare beyond its own 
territorial claims and the adjacent waters. The Monroe 
Doctrine thus almost became a dead letter until President 
John Tyler dusted and used it in the Texas land grab. With 
the acquisition of the Pacific Coast and its recognized 
strategic value, the expansionists saw the value of such an 
instrument and sought to apply it to Central America. 
At the time the Monroe Doctrine was first announced, 
the American attitude toward Great Britain had improved be-
cause of the well-known position of t he British Prime 
Minister George Canning toward the Holy Alliance. Although 
3 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin-American Policy of the 
United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19431, 
P • 98 . 
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the Holy Alliance represented the mystical views of Russia's 
Alexander I and had no real force behind it, it could have 
been used to reestablish a claim of British sovereignty over 
the American colonies had England so desired. Yet without 
revealing his own views and carefully refraining from any 
acts which might cause antagonism, Canning carried out a 
policy which would render the Monroe Doctrine ineffective 
when it would conflict with British interests in Central 
America. 
Canning's general policy was to prevent the Latin-
American states from looking toward the United States for 
help and seeking alliances with her. To make this policy 
effective, Great Britain had to make secure her political 
and economic influence. This British influence was en-
countered when American capitalists made plans for the con-
struction of a canal through southern Mexico. However, be-
cause British interests were so strongly entrenched by this 
time and because of the war which had just opened with Mexico, 
it was thought unwise to attempt negotiations for the 
Nicaraguan route and interest shifted to the Isthmus of 
Panama. 
That isthmus was then the property of New Granada, 
now Colombia, and that republic was in a parlous state. 
A dozen years of domestic strife had reduced it to little 
better than a ruin, and both the contending factions were 
glad to accept overtures from the United States for an 
enterprise which would restore prosperity and for a 
treaty which would protect them from external foes.4 
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The expanding British protectorate over the Mosquito 
Coast aroused the fears of New Granada particularly when 
England and France refused a proposal for an international 
treaty for neutralization of the Isthmus. At that time 
there were certain negotiations under way between the United 
States and Colombia for the removal of descriminatory duties 
against United States commerce. The president of New 
Granada offered to make a satisfactory agreement providing 
the United States would guarantee the sovereignty of New 
Granada over the Isthraus of Panama. Without instructions 
to do so, the United States minister Benjamin Bidlack signed 
a treaty with the Colombian Foreign Minister Manuel Maria 
Mallarino in December, 1846. 
This treaty gave to the United States a full and 
exclusive right of transit"• •• by railroad, canal, or 
otherwise ••• across that part of the American Isthmus 
which lay within New Granadan territory ••• u.5 "for lawful 
commerce with tolls no higher than for citizens of New 
Granada.." 6 Article thirty-five of this treaty provided that: 
4 Willis Fletcher Johnson, American Foreign Relations 
(New York: The Century Company, 1916), P• 432. 
5 Ibid., P• 433• 
6 Bemis, Latin-American Policy of the United States, 
po 102. 
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the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously 
to New Granada by the present stipulation, the perfect 
neutrality of the before mentioned Isthmus ••• The 
United States also guarantee., in the same manner, the 
rights of sovereignty and of property which New Granada 
has and possesses over the said territory.7 
In transmitting the treaty to the Senate for ratifi-
cation., President Polk pointed out that the guarantee was 
confined to the "single province of the Isthmus of Panama" 
and the treaty was not "an alliance for a political object 
but for a purely commercial interest." However., whatever the 
implications might have been, the president felt that such a 
guarantee as Article thirty-five was "almost indispensable 
to the construction of a railroad or canal across the terri-
tory."8 The treaty was ratified on June 10., 1848., with but 
a single day's debate. 
No sooner had this treaty been s ~gned than interest 
turned again to Nicaragua. "That country had begun to 
resent the aggression of Great Britain and was desirous of 
escaping from the terms of a treaty which that power had 
extorted f'rom it. 09 The British had seized San Juan near 
7 Ibid., P• 102. 
8 Richardson.,! Compilation of the Messages of the 
Presidents., IV, P• 513. 
9 Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, P• 433. 
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the mouth of the river, held it for some years, and sup-
ported Costa Rica in claims to Nicaraguan territory which 
would control any canal constructed on the Nicaraguan route. 10 
Therefore, the Government of Nicaragua formally appealed to 
the United States for protection in 18470 
The Polk administration did little regarding British 
encroachments in Nicaragua as it was preoccupied with other 
problems--a congressional election and the Mexican War. 
Although the Department of State made no immediate reply, 
President Polk made pointed reference to British activity in 
Central America.ii Early in 1848 he sent Elijah Hise to 
Guatemala to encourage the Central American states to united 
action and also to determine the extent of British ag-
gression. When Hise's report was received, the administration 
was to settle upon a more definite policy calculated to put 
an end to British interference in the Is;hmus.12-
JlO Albert Bucknell Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, An 
Interpretation (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 19"Ib, P• 
119. 
11 Richardson, Messages and Papers, IV, P• 539,540. 
"Should any foreign government attempt to possess it as a 
colony or otherwise to incorporate it with itself, the 
principle avowed by President Monroe in 1824, and reaffirmed 
in my first annual message, that no foreign power shall with 
our consent be permitted to plant or establish any new colony 
or dominion on any part of the North American continent must 
be maintained. In maintaining this principle and resisting 
its invasion by any foreign power we might be involved in 
other wars more expensive and more difficult than that which 
we are now engaged." 
12 Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian 
Diplomacy (Washington: American Historical Association, 1916), 
P • 26. 
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After two months of investigation, Hise wrote that he 
was convinced the British were determined to make themselves 
owners and occupants of the points on the coast of Nicaragua 
which would become the termini of a canal through that 
country. He wrote for authority to negotiate a treaty of 
transit across the state, but feeling that delay would be 
inimical to the interests of the United States, he negoti-
ated a treaty with Nicaragua without waiting for the authori-
ty. The treaty was signed on June 21, 1849, and was a defi-
nite application of the Monroe Doctrine to the situation in 
Central America. The essential feature of the treaty was 
that it gave to the United States the exclusive right to 
construct a canal or railroad across Nicaragua and to forti-
fy and protect it. In return the United States was to pro-
tect Nicaragua in all territory rightfully hers. This was 
a "complete challenge to British pretensions. 1113 
The news of this convention did not reach Washington 
until after the Democratic administration of Polk had given 
way to Zachary Taylor and the Whigs. The new administration 
sent E.G. Squier with more guarded instructions and words of 
friendly promise to Nicaragua, to replace Hise. By this time 
the California gold rush was booming, and demands for a more 
13 Dwight c. Miner, The Fight for the Panama Route 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 194(5"J'"'; P• 15. 
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satisfactory route across the continent were growing in in-
tensityo Public opinion demanded that the administration 
take measures to prevent the British from monopolizing the 
Nicaraguan route. 
When Squier arrived in Central America, he found 
Frederick Chatfield, the British consul in Guatamala, on 
the alert to frustrate his plans. Despite this opposition, 
Squier was able to obtain another treaty with Nicaragua 
which guaranteed that country its sovereignty only over the 
proposed canal route and guaranteed the neutrality of any 
canal constructed by United States citizens as long as it 
was in their handsol.4 He also obtained an agreement which 
ignored the unratified and unauthorized Hise treaty with 
Nicaragua. 
These treaties were collected in Washington and held 
as an offset to British claims. As a result, there developed 
a deadlock in which neither the United States, Great Britain, 
nor the Isthmian countries could construct the cana1. 15 
Developments were speeded when Squier learned of a Chatfield 
plot to seize Tigre Island. Squier hastily concluded a 
treaty with Honduras ceding that island to the United States 
for eighteen months. Chatfield countered this move by 
J.4 Ibid., P• 15. 
1.5 Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 124. 
seizing the island in October, 1849, and holding it until 
ordered out by the commander of the British West Indian 
squadron. 
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Although indignation toward England was high as a 
result of the seizure of Tigre Island, neither country was 
disposed to go to war. At this time a Nicaraguan minister 
arrived in the United States to solicit ratification of the 
Squier treaty. Secretary of State John M. Clayton let it be 
known that the treaty would be sent to the Senate and upon 
obtaining the necessary votes would be ratified by the 
President. The English statesman Sir Henry Bu1wer, in 
Washington at the time to carry on negotiations, realized 
that the chief interest of the American people was the con-
struction of a canal and not the British encroachments in 
Central America. However, Clayton was determined to force 
Great Britain to relinquish her protectorate over the 
Mosquito Coast and directed his activities mainly along this 
line. Bulwer, on the other hand, was just as determined to 
maintain the protectorate but was willing to give up certain 
special advantages which might interfere with the construc-
tion of the cana1. 16 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as signed on April 19, 1850, 
was a compromise between the two opposing views. "Both 
16 Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, p. 90. 
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powers denied any desire to secure a monopoly on any inter-
oceanic route, but maintained that their respective policies 
were to prevent the other from acquiring exclusive advan-
tage."17 The principle stipulations of the treaty were: 
1. Great Britain and the United States agreed never to 
obtain or maintain any exclusive control over the 
proposed Nicaraguan route. 
2. They would neither erect fortifications commanding 
the canal nor occupy, colonize, or exercise dominion 
over any part of Central America. 
3. The two powers agreed to guard the safety and neu-
trality of the canal and invite other nations to join 
with them in doing the same. 
4. They promised to support any company that would con-
struct the canal in accordance with the spirit of the 
convention. 
5. In order to establish a general principle, they 
agreed to extend their protection to any other practi-
able communication whether by canal or railway across 
the Isthmus and particularly to t he proposed inter-
oceanic_Qommunication by way of Tehuantepec or 
Panama.~ 
Throughout the half-century of its existence, the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was a source of irritation to the 
United States. A controversy arose over the matter of in-
terpreting the treaty in regard to the British claims on the 
i7 E. Taylor Parks, Columbia and the United States 
176~-1934 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 
193 ), P• 328. 
18 Henry Steele Comm.ager (ed.), "Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 
April 19, 1850," Documents of American History (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc":", 1948), Doc. No. 177, P• 326. 
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Mosquito Coast and the Bay Islands. Great Britain regarded 
the treaty as definitely establishing her rights to the 
territory over which she had already laid claims; only 
future settlement would be prohibited. The United States 
expected the British to withdraw from the area. When 
Britain continued to maintain her position and when, in 
1856, she formally annexed the Bay Islands, Britain's in-
terpretation of the treaty seemed to be receiving de facto 
recognition. The United States continued to protest, and 
by an agreement known as the Dallas-Clarendon Treaty of 1856, 
an attempt was made to settle the dispute. Great Britain 
was to withdraw- from the Mosquito Coast in return for ack-
nowledgement of her claims over the Bay Islands. The treaty 
failed ratification by the Senate as did a similar one the 
following year. 
President James Buchanan, in his message of December 
8, 1857, declared that the wisest choice would be to abrogate 
the treaty entirely. Great Britain was willing if the status 
quo would be the basis. Since this was the last thing the 
United States wanted, the matter was not pressed. In 1860 
the British signed an agreement with Nicaragua in which a 
nominal sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast was restored to 
England. 19 
19 Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United 
States (New York: D. Appleton Century Company, 1943), P• 103. 
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During the Civil War years the United States was in 
no position either to enf'orce the Monroe Doctrine or to make 
further plans for an interoceanic canalo When it became 
apparent that a civil war was inevitable in the United 
States, Spain proclaimed the reannexation of Santo Domingo, 
and Napoleon III of France set up the Emperor Maximillan in 
Mexico. Great Britain, fearful of an overland invasion of 
Canada, refrained from any adverse actions against the 
Monroe Doctrine. However, with the help of yellow fever in 
Santo Domingo and Benito Juarez in Mexico, both projects were 
miserable failures. The only remaining contenders for con-
trol of any possible Isthmian route were Great Britain and 
the United States, and they were both restrained by the 
terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 
Hardly had the Civil War come to an end before in-
terest in a trans-Isthmian canal revived, and at the same 
time feeling grew that the route must be under American con-
trol. This interest turned to a feeling of urgency when, in 
1880, the Universal Oceanic Canal Company of Paris purchased 
a concession from Panama and announced that plans were ready 
for a tide-level canal. The company was under the presidency 
of Ferdinand de Lesseps, famous as the builder of the Suez 
Canal. 
The prospect of early construction of a canal under 
European control aroused the United States, and Congress 
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passed a resolution that, in the interest of the people of 
the United States, the consent of the United States Govern-
ment be a necessary condition before the construction of any 
canal across the Isthmus. These views were also elaborated 
upon by President Rutherford B. Hayes in a special message 
to Congress on March 7, 1880. 20 
As interest in a canal increased, the idea that the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was hampering the legitimate aspi-
rations of the United States increased. When James A. 
Garfield became president in 1881, he instructed his 
Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, to take measures toward 
the abrogation of the treaty. Instead of taking the matter 
directly to the British, he sent a circular to all European 
countries outlining the American attitude of a canal under 
European control. His efforts easily showed their weaknesses 
and were unsuccessful in making any progress toward abrogation. 
Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Blaine's successor, was equally 
unsuccessful in his attempts to settle the dispute. 
Mr. Frelinghuysen had negotiated a treaty with Nica-
ragua in 1884 which provided for the construction of a canal 
20 Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages--9.f the 
Presidents, VII, p. 583. 11The policy of this country is a 
canal under American control. The United States cannot con-
sent to the surrender of this control to any European power • 
• • • An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will 
essentially change the geographical relations between the 
United States and the rest of the world. It will be the great 
ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and Pacific shores and 
virtually a part of the coast-line of the United States." 
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by the United States under joint control with Nicaragua. In 
return, the United States would guarantee the territorial 
integrity of Nicaragua. When Grover Cleveland became presi-
dent in 1885, he recalled the treaty from the Senate and 
declared that any canal should be for the benefit of the 
entire world. There the matter rested until 1898 when John 
Hay became secretary of state and undertook the task of 
abrogating the troublesome Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. His 
efforts toward this purpose succeeded as brilliantly as his 
predecessors' had failed. 
CHAPTER III 
LOOKING OUTWARD 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century there came 
into existence the "New Manifest Destiny" which was partly 
a revival and partly a continuation of the old manifest 
destiny. There were a number of reasons for this revival: 
(1) the official frontier was disappearing; (2) the nation 
had absorbed the first i mpact of the industrial revolution, 
and it was feared that the American market would become 
saturated forcing the manufacturers into competition with 
European manufacturers; (3) there were expanded necessities 
of continental security especially from the IstlLmus and 
Pacific and Caribbean Islands that controlled the maritime 
approaches; (4) the beginning of a modern navy was evident; 
(5) the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan were turned toward 
a new order of sea power; (6) President Grover Cleveland had 
given new prestige and power to the Monroe Doctrine. 
The last point was given added impetus as a result of 
the Spanish-American War. Coupled with this new prestige 
was the fact that the naval operations of the war, including 
the long voyage of the battleship Oregon from the Pacific 
coast to the Caribbean, had emphasized the need of an 
Isthmian canal. One of the main underlying motives of the 
expansionists of 1898 was to clear the way for the canalo 
Immediately after the w~r, an act of Congress was passed 
which authorized a grant of $1,000,000 to survey the pos-
sible routes of a canal. 
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With the collapse of the French canal company, it 
became evident that the project must be under governmental 
auspices. Congress was only too willing to take on this 
task, for with the beginnings of a modern navy and the teach-
ings of Captain Mahan, the canal was becoming imperative. 
According to Mahan's imperialistic philosophy, an 
expanding foreign commerce was essential to national power 
and prosperity. To compete successfully for the world 
markets, a nation must have a strong mercha~t marine. This 
merchant marine, by earning the freights which would ordi-
narily go to foreign shipping, would increase the wealth of 
the country. These vessels must have secure ports at their 
destination which would mean a network of overseas colonies, 
and they must also have protection throughout their voyages 
which would necessitate a powerful navy. This powerful navy 
would be essential for protecting the overseas colonies, and 
the colonies in turn would provide bases for overseas naval 
operations. 
When, however, a nation such as the United States had 
neither overseas colonies nor a strong navy, the problem was 
entirely different. For the United States the problem would 
be for the navy to insure the shipping of neutral countries 
to our ports in time of war. It would not be sufficient to 
stop an enemy at the coast, for an enemy could effectively 
blockade our ports well out of the sight of land. The only 
possible way to prevent such a blockade would be to main-
1 tain a strong military force afloat. 
Captain Mahan did not believe that the United States 
was destined to remain an isolated country. It was his 
thinking that the United States was destined to become a 
world power with interests and powers calling for a large 
conception of sea power. According to his imperialistic 
thesis, a nation must either expand or decline; and the 
American people, after a period of preoccupation during the 
Civil War, were again looking outward toward foreign markets 
and lands in search of richer life and greater prosperity. 
These aspirations could not be gained, however, without a 
2 struggle. 
By the beginning of the present century the United 
States had become wealthy and powerful enough to carry such 
a design into operation. However, the pivot upon which such 
a program of expansion was to be put into effect was the 
construction of an Isthmian canal. In a general way it was 
evident that a canal would bring to the Carribean area a 
1 Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, p. 129. 
2 Ibid., P• 129. 
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great increase in trade by modifying the general direction 
of trade routes throughout that area. These new routes 
would transform this then comparatively neglected nook of 
the ocean into a thoroughfare of shipping and attract the 
unprecedented interest of maritime nationso 
The expansionists had never neglected the commercial 
advantages in their program. In 1898 they began to win the 
business leaders to their support, for new developments at 
home and abroad had caused a sharp shift in their thinking. 
If American economy were to grow and prosper, it was believed 
that new outlets for American produce must be found. Both 
manufacturers and exporters were looking more avidly toward 
the Far East where it was believed great trade potentials 
existed.3 
The industrialists' thesis can be traced from the 
adrninistration of president William McKinley. To the in-
dustrialists it was a question of either commercial expan-
sion or stagnation and decay, world power or economic decline. 
This thesis was su.mmed up by Senator Beveridge in an address 
delivered in Boston in 1898: 
American factories are making more than the American 
people can use; American soil is producing more than 
they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; 
the trade of the world must and shall be ours. And we 
3 Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power, 
1898-1954 (New York: Harper and Brother~9~), P• 47. 
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will get it as our mother (England) has told us how. 
We will establish trading posts throughout the world 
as distributing points for American products. We will 
cover the ocean with our merchant marine. We will build 
a navy to the measure of our greatness. Great colonies 
governing themselves, flying our flag and trading with 
us,: will grow about our posts of tra:.de. Our institutions 
will follow our flag on the wings of our commerce. And 
American law, American order, American civili~ation, and 
the American flag will plant themselves on shores 
hitherto bloody and benighted, but by those age~cies of 
God henceforth to be made beautiful and bright.~ 
As this industrialist statecraft became more pro-
nounced, Captain Mahan ac~uired more disciples who, in turn, 
converted others. They were generally agreed that every 
position in the Caribbean Sea would enhance commercial and 
military value, and an Isthmian canal would become the 
strategic center of most vital importance. 
Like the transcontinental railroad, the canal would 
be a link between the oceans; but unl "ke it, the use, unless 
guarded by treaties, would belong wholly to possibly bel-
ligerent powers which controlled the sea by their naval 
powero In case of war the United States would unquestionably 
control the railroads, but no less unquestionably would it 
be impotent to defend the Central-American canal against the 
great maritime powers. 
The self-imp0sed isolation of the United States during 
4 Senator Albert Jeremiah Beveridge as quoted in: 
Charles Austin Beard, The Open Door at Home (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 19341, p o 38. 
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the thirty years preceding the Spanish-American War in the 
matter of markets and decline of shipping resulted in an 
actual remoteness of this country with the rest of the world. 
With the piercing of the Isthmus, this isolation would pass 
and with it the indifference to the rest of the world. 
From wheresoever they come and whithersoever they go, 
all ships that use the canal will pass through the 
Caribbean. Whatever the effect produced upon the pros-
perity of the adjacent continent and islands by the 
wants attendant upon maritime activity, around such a 
focus of t~ade will center large commercial and political 
The geographical position of the United States between 
the two Old Worlds and the two oceans was bound to be strength-
ened by the expanding European colonizations in the Pacific, 
the advancing Japanese civilization, and the rapid movement 
of people toward the Pacific coast. 
Cap,tain Mahan was by no means the only prophet of 
America's imperial destiny. Prominent political scientists, 
sociologists, and historians were also propagating the gospel 
of imperialism in the early nineties. But it was Mahan and 
his politically influential friends and satellites, Henry 
Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, who were the most vocif-
erous in pressing their ideas of national security, commercial 
expansion, cosmopolitan philanthropy, national honor, and 
5 Alfred T. Mahan, "The United States Looking Out-
ward," The Atlantic Monthly, 66:.816-824, December, 1890. 
national prestige in support of imperialism and naval 
aggrandizement. 6 
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To put into effect this large policy of commercial 
expansion, acquisition of colonies, and supremacy of United 
States naval power, the Central-American Isthmus must be 
pierced. All shades of the expansionists' school realized 
this fact, and Congress was willing to do their share in 
the undertaking. The only bottleneck at that time was the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. The task of abrogating or 
at least modifying this estoppel fell to John Hay, Secretary 
of State under President McKinley. 
The provision of the Clayto'n-Bulwer Treaty stating 
that the canal zone was not to be fortified was particularly 
irksome. The efforts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen had proved 
futile, so Secretary of State Richard Olney, in 1896, tried 
new tactics. He admitted that the treaty was in full force 
and vigor but suggested that an attempt in a direct and 
straightforward manner be made to reconsider the whole 
matter.7 
Hay's task of modifying the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was 
eased somewhat by England's decision to strengthen her po-
sition by withdrawing from any contest for predominance in 
6 Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, P• 127. 
7 John Bassett Moore,! Digest of International Law 
(Washington:· Government Printi1;1g Office, 1906), III, p. 209. 
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North and South America and by cultivating the friendship of 
the United States as a possible ally in Asia. 8 With British 
withdrawal from the Caribbean, there arose the problem of 
defending North America from new enemies--first the Japanese 
or German navies and, after 1914, the possibility of having 
to defend both the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time. 
Instead of following his party's view that the treaty 
was void or voidable, McKinley chose to adopt the policy of 
his Democratic predecessor . The British ambassador was 
assured that the convention would not be ignored, but he was 
also impressed with the American concept that in light of 
recent developments appropriate modifications were desired 
to allow the United States to construct and control the 
canal . 9 
Since British political isolation in Europe suggested 
more cordial relations with the United States, Lord J. 
Pauncefote, the British ambassador to the United States, 
promised consideration of Hay's draft for a new convention. 
However, Washington's firm stand regarding the Alaska-
Canadian boundary dispute prevented immediate conclusion of 
the negotiations. With the strong possibility of action by 
Congress and its becoming apparent that Hay was not unwilling 
8 Samuel Flagg Bemis,! Diplomatic History of the 
United States (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19361,p. 509 . 
9 Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 
P • 301- 302. 
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to continue the absolute neutralization of the canal, some 
action became necessary to avoid embarrassment. 
On Fegruary 5, 1900, the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 
was signed. The provisions or the treaty permitted the 
United States to build the proposed canal at its own expense 
and operate it on terms of entire equality for all nations, 
free and open in time of peace and war. This first treaty 
specifically prohibited the fortification of the canal, and 
since the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was not abrogated, it pre-
vented the United States from exercising sovereignty or 
dominion over a canal route or state. 10 
The expansionists of 1898, led by Governor Theodore 
Roosevelt of New York, were quick to point out that if the 
treaty were ratified, it would weaken rather than strengthen 
the position of the United States vis-a-vis a superior naval 
force. An enemy force could send its fleet through the 
canal to attack either coast, thus requiring part of our 
fleet to defend the canal which should be used for offensive 
purposes. Thus, by a stroke of the pen Hay would have ham-
strung the future naval defenses of the United States. 
The Senate refused to ratify the treaty until some 
provision was made to supersede the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
and provtde for"• •• more liberal provisions for American 
10 Bemis, The Latin-American Policy of the United 
States, p. J.41+. 
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defense of the work, and the exclusion of other nations from 
11 
the pact.u Great Britain was unwilling to accept the 
amendments demanded by the Senate, still hoping to couple 
the canal negotiations with the Alaska-Canadian boundary 
dispute. 
Secretary Hay was persuaded to remain in office and 
to try to obtain a more favorable agreement. Great Britain 
still maintained her dangerous isolation, and since she was 
in need of the friendship of the United States, she was 
still willing to continue negotiations. The three amend-
ments required by the Senate for ratification were that (1) 
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty be superseded, (2) the United 
States be permitted to defend and maintain public order, and 
12 (3) other nations not be allowed to join the pact. Great 
Britain refused to accept these changes, and Hay resigned 
his position in disgust. President McKinley, who had not 
tried to help the treaty through the Senate, persuaded Hay 
to remain and again to try to obtain a more favorable 
agreement with Great Britain. 13 
11 E. Taylor Parks, Colombia and the United States 
1765-1934 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 
1935), P• 386. 
12 Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 
P• 510. 
13 Ibid., P• 510. 
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After conferring with Lord Pauncefote and leading 
senators, Mr. Hay accordingly proceeded to secure a new 
convention. In the course of several months of friendly 
negotiations, all differences were overcome, and on November 
18, 1901, the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was signed. The 
Senate ratified the treaty of February 12, 1902, by a vote 
of seventy-two to six. 
The second treaty was a compromise between the first 
treaty and the Senate amendments. Article I of the treaty 
expressly abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The second 
article provided that the canal might be constructed di-
rectly or indirectly by the United States Government, and it 
should have the exclusive right to regulate and manage it. 
Article III assured the neutralization of the canal under 
substantially the same rules as those re gulating the Suez 
Canal. 
The most important article of the new treaty was the 
first whereby the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was superseded. 
Although there were no provisions regarding fortifications, 
the United States was given the right to establish military 
policy to protect it from lawlessness. As the canal was to 
be entirely neutral during time of war (Article III, Rule 2), 
the logical inference was that the United States would not 
be prevented from erecting fortifications to insure its 
defense. 
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Article IV stipulated that: 
"• •• no change of territorial sovereignty or of inter-
national relations of the country or countries traversed 
by the beforementioned canal shall effect the general 
principle of neutralization or the obligation~pf the High 
Contracting Parties under the present treaty • .L.4-
As far as Great Britain was concerned, the United 
States was free to proceed with the construction of the 
canal over whatever route appeared most practical. In 
clearing the way Great Britain had made the greater con-
cession. The United States was apparently unappreciative 
of this fact when questions arose as to the interpretation 
of the treaty. 15 
Thus, with the signing and ratif cat ion of the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty the preliminar y stage of the great proje ct 
was accomplished. Now came the wearisome negotiations with 
the Latin-American states to secure the rights of constr uction. 
14 Commager, Documents of American History, p. 200. 
15 Bemis, A Diplomatic Histor! of the United States, 
P• 510. "President Roosevelt careful ystated in his annual 
message of December 3, 1901, that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
'is abrogated'; and the British government in its note of 
November 14, 1912, declared that it was •superseded•. It 
was the rules incorporated in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 
rather that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty on which Great Britain 
chose to rest her successful protest against the act of 
August 24, 1912, which exempted from tolls American coastwise 
vessels using the Panama Canal. Rule l stated: The canal 
shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war 
of all nations observing these Rules on terms of entire 
equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against 
any such nation or its citizens or subjects, in respect of 
the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise. Such 
conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable." 
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President Theodore Roosevelt, who had succeeded the 
assassinated McKinley in the interim of the two treaties, 
expressed his concern and relief in seeing the way cleared 
of existing estoppels in a note to Mr. Hay. 
The great bit of work of my administration and from the 
material and constructive standpoint one of the greatest 
bits of work that the twentieth centu~y will see is the 
Isthmian Canal. In the negotiations to start this 
straight I must trust to you and Knox. I hope you will 
take personal direction.lb 
Just two days before the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was 
signed the Walker Commission, after a thorough investigation 
of both the Nicaraguan and the Panama routes, reported in 
favor of the former; "• •• however, the decision was not so 
much on the ground of its superior merits as the seeming 
inability to secure the unfinished Panama works at a reason-
able price."17 The commission estimatLj the value of the 
French company at not more than $40,000,000; and inasmuch as 
the French company estimated their holdings at $109,141,500, 
there was no need to consider the Panama route further. 
However, when the Hepburn Bill was proposed providing for 
the construction of the canal through Nicaragua, the French 
company became panic stricken and offered to sell their 
interests at the figure set by the Walker Commission. As a 
l6 Roosevelt to Hay: as quoted in Alfred L. P. Dennis, 
Adventures in American Diplomact 1896-1906 (New York: Eo P. 
Dutton and Company, 1928), P• I 6. 
17 Parks, Colombia and the United States, P• 387. 
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result of this offer, the commission filed a supplementary 
report recommending the adoption of the Panama route. 
Each route had its strong advocates in Congress, and 
it is improbable that the pressure of the lobbyists"• •• 
had ever been applied with greater skill or more fateful 
consequence than during the 'Battle of the Routes."1-8 The 
three leading individuals in this group were Mark Hanna, 
senator from Ohio whose support was largely responsible for 
the vote favorable to the Panama route; William Nelson 
Cromwell, who in the light of available evidence was"• •• 
the only member of the trio whose leading motive was un-
questionably hope of material gain ••• ; 1119 and the French-
man Philippe Bunau-Varilla. Although Bunau-Varilla was a 
stockholder and at one time chief engineer of the French 
construction company, he was primarily a zealot and propa-
gandist. "With him a conviction soon became a Crusade for 
Trutho He prosecuted his campaign for Panama with an almost 
religious fervor. 1120 
Before the French offer had become generally known, 
the House had passed the Hepburn Bill which authorized the 
President to secure the Nicaraguan route, and it needed only 
18 Miner, The Fight for the Panama Route, P• 75. 
19 Ibid., P• 76. 
20 Ibid., P• 77. 
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the approval of the Senate to make it a law. The opposing 
forces in the Senate were led by John T. Morgan of Alabama 
who favored the Nicaraguan route, and Mark Hanna, who was 
determined to obtain the Panama route. Debate on the 
Hepburn Bill commenced on June 4 and continued with inter-
ruptions until the 19th. Morgan opened the battle by 
pointing out the seismic instability of Panama, its political 
unrest, unhealthful conditions, and that the French company 
could not show clear title to its interests. He also stated 
that the proposed Spooner amendment did not give the Presi-
dent the right to choose the route but directed him to 
negotiate with Colombia first. 21 The champions of the 
Panama route met this argument with the charge that the 
northern route was also susceptible to earthquakes as well 
as volcanic activity. Cromwell's propaganda had also em-
phasized this fact for many months. 
The Spooner amendment authorized the President to 
purchase the rights and property of the Panama company for 
not more than $40,000,000 and to secure the necessary rights 
from Colombia for the construction of the canal. It con-
tained the proviso that if a satisfactory arrangement could 
not be made with both the French company and Colombia within 
a reasonable time, he should proceed with construction on the 
21 Miner, The Fight for the Panama Route, p. 147. 
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Nicaraguan route. 22 
The group in the Senate which favored the Panama 
route and subsequently the Spooner amendment generally 
followed the report of the Walker Commission in presenting 
their case. When questions were asked of individual mem-
bers of the Walker Commission, the main query was whether or 
not the reversal of the decision to recommend the Nicaraguan 
route was based principally on the ground that the French 
company offered to sell their interests for $40,000,000. 
Every member except one agreed that the Nicaraguan route was 
recommended only because a reasonable price for the Panama 
route was thought unattainable. 23 
The proponents of the Nicaraguan route were by no 
means idle during the debates. Their forces, led by Senator 
Morgan, directed most of their activity toward Cromwell and 
his lobby group. The Senator quoted his own canal committee's 
report of May 16, 1900, which had condemned the attorney's 
tactics. He described as "humiliatingn and "repulsive" 
the direct, constant, and offensive intrusion of the 
Panama Canal Company into the legislation of Congress, 
the hearings of committees, the deliberations of canal 
comrnissions, and the frequent presentation of letters of 
advice and remonstrance to the Secretary of State, and 
to the President, rebuking the condpct of the House of 
Representatives and its ignorance.24 
22 Stuart, Latin America and the United States, p. 114. 
23 Miner, The Fight for the Panama Route, po 154. 
24 Congressional Record, 57th Congo, 1st Sess. 
(Washington~ Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 6927. 
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The real test came on the afternoon of the 19th when 
a motion was made to substitute the minority report for the 
majority. A poll of the senators showed forty-two in favor 
of the amendment and thirty-four opposed with twelve not 
voting. On the final vote the Spooner bill was passed by a 
vote of sixty-seven to six. 
At first the House refused to abandon the Hepburn 
Bill; however, after a few days' discussion, the House 
yielded preferring the Spooner amendment to no legislation 
at all. The House passed the bill by a vote of 260 to 
eight apparently believing that the French company could 
not give a clear title to its interests. 25 
When Attorney-General Philander C. Knox returned to 
the United States, after a trip to Paris to determine the 
validity of the French company, he reported that a clear 
title could be given. With this decision the Panama route 
had been chosen and the way cleared for an agreement with 
Colombia to begin construction. 
25 Miner, The Fight for the Panama Route, p. 156. 
CHAPTER IV 
INTERNATIONAL EMINENT DOMAIN? 
The passage of the Spooner Act was considered only a 
temporary victory for the supporters of the Panama route. 
Morgan 1 s forces were checked, but they still held hopes of 
victory as they were confident that the French company could 
not give a clear title to its investments in Panama. An 
investigation was conducted in Paris, and at its end 
Attorney-General Knox presented his decision that a clear 
title could be given. Interpretation of French law was one 
of the intricacies which confronted the jurists, but this 
piece of technical research was simple compared with that 
which confronted Secretary Hay in his negotiations with the 
I Bogata government. 
Hay's task of obtaining a fa orable treaty with 
Colombia would have been greatly alleviated had there been 
a stable government with which to negotiate. From the pro-
mulgation of a constitution in 1886, Rafael Nunez controlled 
the country with dictatorial powers. The government was 
controlled by conservative elements, and this period was 
much more orderly and peaceful than the preceding liberal 
period. However, there was considerable disturbance from 
the liberal elements who were unwilling to assume the 
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position of political "outs. 111 
In 1899 a serious revolt broke out which, in a few 
months, assumed the proportions of a civil war. In the 
summer the vice-president, Jos~ Manuel Marroquin, seized 
power, and it was not until June, 1903, that the war ended 
with the liberals defeated. 2 Thus, when negotiations for a 
treaty were undertaken in earnest, the conservative govern-
ment of Marroquin was firmly entrenched, but the liberal 
elements lost no opportunity to harass and embarrass the 
administration. 
Early in 1901 Secretary Hay was assured by the 
Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Martinez Silva, 
the transfer of the French concessions to the United States 
if an acceptable treaty could be arranged f or construction 
and operation of the canal. The minister expressed hope 
that misunderstanding might not cause the United States to 
accept the Nicaraguan route.3 
Early in 1902 Silva was replaced by Jose Vincente 
Concha, who presented a new basis for a concessionary treaty. 
He stated that Colombia would greatly increase her concessions 
l Mary Wilhelmine Williams, The People and Politics of 
Latin America (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), p. 507. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Parks, Colombia and the United States, p. 388. 
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by renouncing all reversionary rights, granting a more ex-
tensive canal zone, making available the facilities of her 
ports to aid in the construction work, relinquishing her 
rights in the Panama railroad, and limiting her share of 
the profits to a reasonable arnount.4 
After the passage of the Spooner Act, Secretary Hay 
presented certain modifications to this draft which pointed 
out that the principal controversial subjects were (1) 
proper respect for Colombian sovereignty over the Isthmus, 
(2) adequate protection for investments and traffic, and (3) 
the monetary consideration due Colombia. The last point was 
the most persistent as Colombia desired $ 7,000,000 cash and 
an annuity, after 14 years to be fixed by a nonpartisan 
commission. Hay suggested $ 7,000,000 cash and an annuity 
of $100,000. 
On September 9 Concha was instructed to sign the 
modified treaty. However, before the instructions reached 
him, the Colombian civil war had necessitated the landing 
of American troops to maintain the free transit across the 
Isthmus. Concha then maintained that the changed condition 
prohibited him from signing the proposed treaty. It was un-
fortunate that Concha was not informed of the true state of 
affairs. President Marroquin reasoned that by appealing for 
4 Ibid., P• 389. 
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aid under the terms of the 1848 convention, the revolution-
ary forces could be put down, a new congress could be 
assembled, and a treaty with the United States could be 
amended to their own advantage.5 
Concha was in a state of consternation and soon left 
for New York informing the State Department that ill health 
I necessitated his return to Bogata_. In truth, Concha was 
the subject of great nervous excitement; when he disobeyed 
the instructions of his government, he was recalled at the 
end of November, 1902, and"• •• was taken aboard the ship 
at New York in a strait-jacket."6 Tomas Herran, secretary 
of the legation and former American consul at Medellin, 
, 
remained as Charge ad interim. 
On December 10 Secretary Hay telegraphed Charles B. 
Hart, minister to Colombia, inquiring whether or not Herran 
was to receive full powers, emphasizing that, as it was 
II . . . provided that in the event of failure to secure such 
a treaty after a reasonable time, recourse should be had to 
building a canal through Nicaragua • • • it, 7 the time element 
was becoming critical. The next day President Marroquin 
5 Miner, Fight for the Panama Route, p. 164. 
6 Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, P• 314. 
7 Message of the President, December 7, 1903, 
American State Papers, Class!, Foreign Relations (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1904) P. XXXII. Hereinafter 
cited as A. So P., F. R. 
properly empowered him. 8 Even then there were d lays and 
on December 30, 1902, Secretary Hay wired to Bogat : 
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We have made all possible cone ssions to Colombia in 
canal matter; have ceded article twenty-three, also 
question of perpetuity, and several minor concessions. 
We can go no further. It is incumbent on Colombia now 
to say promptly whether they want the canal 01" ~ot . 
Nicaragua offers perfectly satisf ctory treaty. 
There were still further delays, due partly to th 
opposition of the liberals in Colombia who fear d that if 
too large a suin were paid at once, it could be used to sup-
press them and maintain indefinitely the administration of 
Marroquin. They tried to gain assurances that the money 
would be "properly" applied.lo Meanwhile rumors of v rious 
sorts were afloat. Certain papers reported that Colombia 
was deliberately stalling because a German syndicate was 
11 ready to purchase the French company 1 s ri s. 
8 Parks, Colombia and the United States, • 390. 
9 Hay to Hart, November 22, 1902, Department of' State, 
M.S., Diplomatic Instructions to the United States Ministers 
in Colombia, Vol. 19, p. 213. Hereinafter cited as D.I., 
r.u.s.M. 
lO Ibid., P• 315. 
11 Miner, Fight for the Panama Route, p. 192; "I can 
so.y th re is not a scrap regarding German opposit ·· on to the 
treaty with Colombia in the archives of the Department of 
State, the Roosevelt Papers, or the Hay Papers. The nearest 
w come to the story is an inquiry from Hay which came to 
nothing. This month of January, 1903, was of course n time 
when public opinion was much vexed because of the G rma.n 
block de of Venezuelan ports," Denis, Adventures in American 
Diplomacy, footnote, p. 338. --
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Secretary Hay had, in the meantime, increased the 
annuity offer to $250,000, but Herran was instructed to 
demand $600,000 annual rental. Before Herran could secure 
I new advice from Bogata, a movement started in Congress to 
secure the Nicaraguan route. Hay's warnings merely brought 
assurance from Herran that he was daily expecting new in-
structions from his government. Finally, almost in desper-
ation, Hay wired Hart that "If Colombian Government persists 
in present attitude, it renders further negotiations im-
possible."12 
On January 21 Hay delivered the long-awaited ulti-
matum which read: 
I am commanded by the President to inform you that the 
reasonable time provided in the statute for the con-
clusion of the negotiations with Colombia for excavation 
of an Isthmian Canal has expired, a1 l he has authorized 
me to sign the treaty of which I had the honor to give 
JOU a draft, with the modification that the sum of 
$100,000 fixed therein as the annual payment, be in-
creased to $250,000. I am not authorized to consider 
or discuss any other change.L3 
This ultimatum brought the desired results, for on 
January 22 Herran signed the treaty without instructions 
I from Bogata. Three days later a cable arrived from Marroquin 
ordering Herran not to sign the treaty but to await new in-
12 Hay to Hart, January 16, 1903, as quoted in Parks, 
Colombia and the United States, P• 391. 
13 Hay t o Herrian, January 21, 1903, Department of 
State, M. s., Notes to Foreign Legation Minister in Colombia, 
Vol. 7, P• 354. 
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structions. 
The Hay-Herran Treaty was sent to the Senate on 
January 24 and was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Senator Morgan, as a member of that committee, 
proposed amendments, possibly not so much with the hope of 
defeating the treaty and seeing them adopted, but to spread 
the feeling among his colleagues that Colombia would reject 
the treaty.14 
The first session of the Fifty-eighth Congress con-
vened on March 5 and promptly undertook consideration of 
the canal treaty. Senator Morgan, in a report that filled 
ninety pages of the Congressional Record, attacked almost 
every article of the treaty, the Colombian people and 
characterized the Panamanians as"• •• 
fied, turbulent, mixed, and filthy. 1115 
degraded, dissatis-
Cromwell and his law partners worked constantly to 
refute the charges of Morgan and to defeat all proposed 
amendments. This in itself was not an easy matter, for even 
some of the most staunch supporters of the Panama route 
believed that certain changes were necessary. Particularly 
Ji4 The Debates and Proceedings of the United States 
(Vol. 37, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), 
58th Cong., 1st Sess., P• 21. Hereinafter cited as Cong. 
Rec. 
15 Cong. Rec., 58th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 101. 
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was there an insistent demand that the United States receive 
specific permission to fortify and defend the canal and 
exercise absolute sovereignty over it. 16 Cromwell pointed 
out that this would insure rejection by Colombia, as every 
possible concession had been made. He even had Herran 
write him a letter to this effect which he showed to those 
senators who were sponsoring amendments. 17 
As the day set for the vote approached, the leaders 
of the Panama route gradually withdrew their amendments and 
put pressure on the rank and file. On March 17 the treaty 
was ratified without amendment by a vote of seventy-three 
to five. 
The treaty provided for a payment by the United 
States to Colombia of $10,000,000 and an annual rental of 
$250,000 . The French New Panama Canal Company was thereby 
authorized to transfer its properties and franchise to the 
United States which was to construct and maintain a canal 
across the Isthmus of Panama for one hundred years with the 
option of renewal for seccessive periods. The United States 
was given control over a strip of land three miles on either 
side of the canal but excluding the cities of Panama and 
Colon. Colombia had the righ.t to transfer, free of charge 
l6 Ibid., P• 109-111. 
17 Miner, Fight for the Panama Route, p. 199. 
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through the canal, ships, troops, and munitions and retain 
technical sovereignty over the strip.18 The treaty now had 
only to pass the Colombian Senate and construction could 
begin. This approval was never obtained. 
From the first it was apparent that the treaty was 
to undergo rough handling by the Colombian Senate. Arthur 
M. Beaupre, replacing Mr. Hart who had resigned for personal 
reasons, warned that: 
Without question public opinion is strongly against 
its ratification, but, of course public opinion in 
Colombia is not necessarily a potent factor in con-
trolling legislation. 
It is quite impossible to come to a definite con-
clusion as to the outcome until the result of the recent 
elections for members of Congress is knowno It has been 
generally thought that the Government would be able to 
control the elections and that the members returned would 
be favorable to the administration's views on the canal 
question; but there has been serious disappointment to 
the governmental party in the result o~ some of the elec-
tions heard from ••• 
It seems altogether probable that unless the Govern-
ment is thoroughly in earnest in its desire to have the 
convention ratified, it will not be done; and there is 
a possibility it will not go through in any event ••• 
It is apparent lately that the French Canal Company 
is to take a decided interest in securing the ratifi-
cation of the convention, and that its influence to that 
end will be of much importance.19 
Jill Text in Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal, 
Senate Documents, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 47~ (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1910), P• 277-288. 
l9 Arthur M. Beaupre (minister to Colombia) to 
Secretary Hay, March 30, A.S.P., F.R., p. 133-134. 
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Any hope of still securing ratification by Colombia 
was given another blow when Beaupre wired that: 
••• the opposition to the ratification of the Canal 
convention is intensifying. The press is teeming with 
articles rancorous in enmity to the proposed treaty, 
while public opinion is veering into a current of 
extreme bitterness against the authors of the pact, 
especially Mr. Herran ••• It is entirely impossible 
to convince these people that the Nicaragua route was 
ever seriously considered by the United States; that 
the negotiations concerning it had any other motive than 
the squeezing of an advantageous bargain out of Colombia; 
nor that any other than the Panama route will ever be 
selected.20 
The treaty was, in effect, defeated before the 
Colombian Congress meta Party politicians saw in the agi-
tation an opportunity to overthrow the adrninistration. 2 ~ 
Consequently, an attempt was made to secure more money from 
the French company, which received an official note from the 
Colombian Government stating that: 
••• it did not think the convention would be ratified, 
because of the opinion that the compensation was in-
sufficient, but that if the Canal Company would pay to 
Colombia about te~ millions of dollars, ratification 
could be secured. 2 
On April 15, 1903, word came that the treaty had been 
I rejected at Bogata on the 12th. This action was no surprise, 
and, as a result of the press carnpaign against the treaty, 
was undoubtedly in accordance with the real wishes of the 
P• 150. 
20 Ibid., P• 142-143• 
2i Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, P• 317. 
22 Beaupre to Hay, June 10, 1903, A.S.P., F.R. (1904), 
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people. It was unfortunate for the Colombian Congress and 
people that they did not realize the money was the least of 
the great benefits to Colombia; "• •• the real value of the 
treaty was that it would bring suddenly to Colombia, par-
ticularly to the Colombian state of Panama, the inestimable 
advantage of a highly prosperous seat at the crossroads of 
one of the two greatest waterways of the world. 1123 
By their failure to ratify the Hay-Herran Treaty the 
Colombian Congress threw away this priceless advantage. 
"Those small-minded senators thought they might get more 
money from both the United States and from the Panama 
company. 1124 The political situation in Colombia probably 
had an effect; for if the Liberal party could muster enough 
support to defeat the treaty, it could possibly embarrass 
the administration enough to force it out of power. Regard-
less of the motives for the refusal to ratify the treaty, 
the Colombian Congress had every right for its refusal, just 
as the United States had a right to refuse to ratify the 
first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty or any of the others over which 
the Senate exercised its constitutional prerogative. 
The rejection of the treaty by Colombia, however much 
it irritated President Roosevelt and other leading proponents 
23 Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 
P• 513. 
24 Ibid. 
of the Panama route, did not give the United States the 
right to interfere with the internal affairs of Colombia, 
nor did the treaty of 1848 give any such right beyond 
guaranteeing the neutrality of the canal route; more spe-
cifically, it guaranteed the sovereignty of Colombia over 
the Isthmus. 
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I At Bogata, in October, two bills were introduced in 
the Colombian Congress to amend the treaty. The first 
authorized the President of Colombia to make treaties for 
the construction of a canal which would be advantageous 
to Colombia. The second favored the termination of the 
concessions to the French company in 1904, ignoring the 
agreement which extended their option to 1910; "• • • if 
the arrangement made extending the contract is declared null 
and void, the French company's rights and interests on the 
Isthmus cease to exist, and Colombia could then arrange with 
the United States to receive not only the $10,000,000 of-
fered her, but the $40 ,000,000 offered the company. 1125 
Neither of these bills was acted upon before the Congress 
adjourned on October 31. 
The rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty was a great 
disappointment to the inhabitants of Panama, who considered 
it a sacrifice of their interests. Some of Panama's foremost 
25 Beaupre to Hay, September 30, A.S.P., F . R. (1903), 
P • 205. 
citizens conferred with the American agent of the Panama 
Railroad Company regarding the advisibility of organizing 
68 
a revolution. Before a revolution was decided upon, it was 
considered advisable to send Dr. Manuel Amador to the United 
States. Amador had conferences with William Cromwell and 
Secretary Hay, but the latter merely outlined what he con-
sidered the rights and duties of the United States under the 
1848 convention. 26 
Amador was almost desperate when he met Bunau-Varilla, 
who had arrived in New York on September 22, 1903. The latter 
tried to persuade Amador that the United States would be 
obliged to intervene in any revolution in Panama as the 
treaty of 1848 was still in effect; "• •• of the two 
political entities--the great protecting power (the United 
States) and the small protected power (Panama) --which had 
the greatest interest to end such a ridiculous situation? 
It was evidently the United States, and furthermore she had 
the greatest interest in settling the Panama Canal question. 1127 
Amador was not convinced that action by the United 
States was secured and insisted that the revolutionists 
needed $6,000,000 to affect successfully the revolution. 
Bunau-Varilla explained that $100,000 would be sufficient 
26 Latane, American Foreign Policy, P• 532. 
2 7 Phillippe Bunau-Varilla, Panama, The Creation, 
Destruction, and Resurrection (New York: McBride, Nast, and 
Company, 19141,p. 314-3150 
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and offered to produce the surn from his own pocket . When 
Amador still refused t o concede that $100 , 000 would be suf-
ficient, Bunau- Varilla intimated in his conversations that 
he would withdraw his support if Amador did not agree to 
carry out the revolution with the $100,000 . On October 16 
Amador conceded that 11 • • • I am nothing but a fool . I have 
understood, pardon me, I shall obey. 11 28 Bunau-Varilla then 
told Amador to leave on October 20 for Panama, adding that 
he l'Ould give him a precise program of action before he 
sailed . 29 
By mid-October Hay was reported to have said that a 
revolution in Panama would break out but added, "we shall 
not be caught napping . Orders have been given to naval 
forces on the Pacific to sail towards thA Isthmus . 11 3° On 
October 15 a report came to President Roosevelt that a 
revolution in Panama was imminent, and that with the failure 
of Colombia to ratify the Hay-Herran Treaty, revolution would 
take place immediately . 
When the Colombian Congress adjourned on October 30 
without the ratification, Roosevelt at once ordered the naval 
vessels Boston, Dixie , Atlanta, and Nashville to proceed 
28 •. , P • 316 . 
29 Ibid . 
30 As quoted in Dennis , Adventures in American Di-
p lomacy , P • 330 . 
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within easy reach of the Istbrnus and to31 
Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If inter-
ruption is threatened by armed force, occupy the line 
of railroad. Prevent the landing of any armed force, 
either government of insurgent, at any point within 
fifty miles of Panama. Government force reported ap-
proaching Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing, 
if in your
2
judgement, the landing would precipitate a 
coni'lict.j 
The revolutionists in Panama were greatly disappointed 
by the failure of Dr. Amador to secure definite promises for 
support from the United States, but their spirits rose when 
they learned of the coming of the American war vessels. As 
there would be no insurgent forces to be landed, the order 
could apply only to Colombian forces. The insurgents were 
stilJ slow in taking advantage of the situation, and 
Washington was beconring impatient. On November 3 a dispatch 
·fas sent to the American consuls at Panama and Colon. The 
sequence of these dispatches reveal that the State Depart-
ment was fully informed of the impending revolution. 
November 3: 
4:30--Uprising on isthmus reported. Keep Department 
promptly and fully informed. Loomis, Acting . 
8:15--No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night. 
Situation is critical. 
3l Latane, American Foreign Policy, P• 533. 
32 Orders to warships Nashville and Dixie, November 2, 




9:00--Uprising occurred to-night, 6; no bloodshed. Army 
and navy officials3taken prisoner. Government will be organized tonight. 3 
Before the warship Nashville received orders to 
prevent the landing of forces, 4.,50 Colombian troops ha.d 
landed at Colon. New orders were sent to detain them at 
Colon, but these orders were unnecessary since the railroad 
officials had refused to transport any of the troops. At 
Panama City the revolution was quite easily accomplished. 
"The rebels seem to have been permitted to draw on the 
Colombian bank account, and therefore experienced little 
difficulty in making conversions to their cause. 11 34 
On receipt of the news of the revolution at Panama, 
Colonel Torres threatened hostilities against the American 
forces at Colon. However, he was persuaded with a consider-
ation (reported to have been $8 ,000) to return with his 
troops to the mainland. On the morning of November 6, the 
Isthmus was cleared of the Colombian forces. 35 
On November 4 the provisional government of Panama 
informed Washington of the "popular" and "spontaneous" move -
ment for independence and requested formal recognition. Two 
days later Hay was informed that all towns of Panama had ad-
herred to the independence movement. Two hours later he 
33 Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal, Senate Docu-
ments, Noo 474, P• 362-63. - -




instructed Consul Felix Ehrman to enter into negotiations 
as soon as he was satisfied that a de facto government, re-
publican in form, and with no opposition from the people, 
had been established. On November 6 the de facto govern-
ment was recognized. 
On November 7 Bunau-Varilla notified the State 
Department of his appointment as envoy extraordinary and 
minister plenipotentiary for Panama. He expressed his 
appreciation for his adopted country for the protection by 
the United States. On November 13 he was officially re-
ceived by President Roosevelto 
The revolution in Panama and the part played by the 
United States have been attacked and defended with equal 
vehemence. Roosevelt was admittedly happ"r over the outcome 
of the revolution, for as early as October 10 he had written 
a personal letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of Review of 
Reviews, in which he said: 
Privately, I freely say to you that I should be de-
lighted if Panama were an independent state, or if it 
made itself so at this moment; but for me to say so pub-
licly would amount to an i~gtigation of a revolt, and 
therefore I cannot say it.j 
In his annual message of December 7, 1903, Roosevelt 
defended his course under the treaty of 1848. He held that 
Colombia was not entitled to bar the transit of the world's 
36 Albert B. Shaw, Literary Digest, October 29, 1904. 
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traffic across the Isthmus and the intervention of the 
United States was justified (1) by our treaty rights, (2) 
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by our international interests, and (3) by the interests of 
collective civilization.37 Whether or not the intervention 
was justified, the new state of Panama was quickly recog-
nized by the European powers followed promptly by the Latin-
American republics (except Colombia). 
All that was now needed to begin construction of the 
canal was an agreement with the new republic. With the 
appointment as negotiator of Bunau-Varilla, who had so long 
fought for the Panama route in a crusading fashion, the 
machinations of William Nelson Cromwell and his company, and 
the burning desire of President Roosevelt for the canal, a 
quick agreement was assured. 
37 Message of the President, December 7, 1903, A.SoP., 
F.R., P• XI, (1904). 
CHAPTER V 
LEGALIZING THE LARCENY 
I When it became generally known in Bogata that the 
revolution in Panama had occurred, popular excitement 
mounted, and large crowds paraded the streets shouting "Down 
with Marroquin" and demanded his resignation. 1 Mr. Beaupre 
cabled that the authorities were desperate, and his cable 
of November 6 clearly indicated this consternation •. 
Knowing that the revolution has already comraenced in 
Panama, General Rafael Reyes says that if the Govern-
ment of the United States will land troops to preserve 
Colombian sovereignty, and the transit, if requested by 
the Colombian charge d 1 affaires, this government will 
declare martial law, and by virtue of its vested consti-
tutional authority, when public order is disturbed, will 
appr~ve by decre~ the ratification of the canal treaty 
as signed; ••• 
This offer was refused perhaps because Roos R~re lt knew 
that a treaty with the new republic of Panama would be more 
advantageous to the United States. In his message to 
Congress on December 7, 1903, he stated that: 
••• By it (the Hay-Bunay-Varilla Treaty) our interests 
are better safeguarded than in the treaty with Colombia 
(the Hay-Herran Trea]y) which was ratified by the Senate 
at its last session. 
l Beaupre to Hay, telegram, November 9, 1903, A.S.P., 
F.R. (1904), P• 227. 
2 Beaupre to Hay, November 6, 1903, Ibid., p. 225. 
3 Message of the President, December 7, 1903, A.S.P., 
F.Ro (1904), P• XXXII. 
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General Rafael Reyes was named chief of a Colombian 
delegation sent to Panama to ascertain what measures could 
be taken to protect his nation's interest without recog-
nizing the independence of Panama. The only thing ac-
complished by his visit to Panama was the information that 
if Colombia were to attempt to reestablish its authority 
over Panama, she would have to fight the United States. 
While the Reyes mission was in Panama, a new canal 
treaty was being shaped into finality in Washington by 
Phillippe Bunau-Varilla. "Phillippe Bunau-Varilla may well 
be called the apostle of Panama, for the decision of the 
United States in favor of this route has been almost entirely 
due to his energy in its behalf. 114 
A graduate of the E6ole Polytechniq,,e5 in 1880, he 
entered the service in what might be called the civil di-
vision and was assigned first to the French possessions in 
North Africa, where he planned and supervised the improvements 
and construction of railroads and harbor improvements in 
Algeria and Tunis. Leter he was delegated by the French 
4 Henry Hale, "M. Bunau-Varilla: Engineer and Diplomat," 
The American Monthly Review of Reviews, 28:677, December, 1903. 
5 The E~ole Polytechnique is not an engineering school. 
It is a military school exclusively devoted to the study of 
pure science, high mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, 
etc. Its aim is to provide the military and civil services 
of the state with officers scientifically educated. Bunau-
Varilla, Panama, footnote, P• 35. 
Government to take up harbor improvements and other public 
works in France, but a project which perhaps attracted the 
most attention in the Old World was the famous Congo Rail-
road in Africa. It was built along the portions of the 
Congo River where navigation was impracticable. 
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Bunau-Varilla stated that his dream of building the 
Panama Canal dated from his boyhood; his dream was achieving 
reality when he persuaded his superiors to send him to 
Panama. In reply to the warnings of the ravages of yellow-
fever there, Bunau-Varilla replied that he was going "As an 
officer runs to it when he hastens to the battle-field, and 
not as the coward who flees from the sorrows of life. 11 6 
When Bunau-Varilla became associated with Panama work 
in 1884, the French company had been engaged in the work 
about two years but had accomplished comparatively little of 
the required construction. During the four years in which 
he was connected with the De Lesseps enterprise, Bunau-Varilla 
had an excellent opportunity to study the topography of the 
Isthmus and to analyze the plans which had been originally 
formulated. Many later-accepted, radical changes in these 
plans were due to Bunau-Varilla 1 s suggestions. 7 
His conclusions after examining the route were that a 
6 Ibid., P• 37• 
7 Hale, Review of Reviews, P• 677. 
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sea-level canal was not only a possibility but could be 
eventually constructed. However, he realized that the 
initial eost of the cut would be prohibitive, so he devised 
a plan of a series of locks which would be utilized until 
the traffic of the canal would warrant a sea-level canal. 
The most notable feature of these locks was that they were 
constructed at a comparatively small cost and could be rela-
tively easily removed.B 
By 1889, $260,000,000 had been spent; and the French 
Canal Company, in which 600,000 French peasants and clerks 
had invested their life savings, went into bankruptcy. Half-
hearted attempts were made to revive the project, and the 
New Panama Canal Company was organized. However, France had 
had more than enough of Panama, and capital could not be 
raised; soon the only course for the company was to sell its 
stock to the United States.9 
At this realization Bunau-Varilla hurriedly returned 
to France. While in Paris he became acquainted with three 
prominent men from Cincinnati, Ohio, who invited him to come 
to the United States and expound his views on Panama and 
N. 10 icaragua. 
8 Ibid., P• 678. 
9 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt,~ Biography 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), P• 303. 
lO Bunau-Varilla, Panama, P• 174-186. 
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After arriv ing in the United States , he went first to 
Cincinnati where he was given letters to Myron T . Herrick of 
Cle eland, a rising member of Senator Hanna's machine, and 
was promised an interview with Hanna himself. In New York 
he met Charles G. Dawes, Comptroller of the Currency, who 
offered to present him to President McKinley. Bunau- Varilla 
began the preparation of a brochure which pointed out the 
advantages of Panama over Nicaragua . The preface of this 
pamphlet stated that his purpose was to work 11 • • • for 
scientific Truth on one of those fields where 
no room for selfish and private aims. 1111 
• there is 
In March he met Mark Hanna, whom he convinced of the 
merits of the Panama route. Hanna stated that he must 
II . . . in the interest of the nation adhere to the same 
principles. 1112 Bunau-Varilla returned to France confident 
that he had sown seeds of truth that would some day result 
in accomplishing his long-sought dream. 
It is difficult to apportion the credit for the 
victory of the Panama revolution. Certainly Bunau-Varilla 
had performed miracles, and for his part he insisted upon an 
appointment as representative to the United States for the 
new republic . This was a difficult concession for Dr. Amador 
11 Ibid., P• 183 . 
12 Ibid. , P • 187. 
-
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to make as he coveted this position for himself. Bunau-
Varilla was commissioned as a diplomatic agent and not as a 
minister plenipotentiary . The provisional government 
announced that Dr. Amador and Fedirico Boyd were on their 
way to the United States to aid Bunau-Varilla in negotiating 
the treaty. They carried a letter to Bunau-Varilla which 
stated: 
You will have to adjust a Treaty for the Canal construc-
tion by the United States. But all the clauses of this 
Treaty will be discussed previously with the delegates 
of the Junta, M. Amador and Boyd. And you wi!l proceed 
with everything strictly in accord with them. 3 
Bunau-Varilla was not one to be shoved aside in this 
fashion. He pressured the provisional government"• •• by 
a suave intimation that he would otherwise block the opening 
of credits for which he had arranged. 1114 Consequently, full 
authority was cabled him while Amador and Boyd were still at 
sea. With his confirmation as plenipotentiary, Bunau-Varilla 
hurried from New York to Washington where he was received by 
Roosevelt on November 13 and frantically began negotiations. 
When negotiations were begun on the treaty, there were 
two obstacles which could seriously hamper negotiations. The 
first was the delegation on its way from Panama. The members 
of the delegation, in spite of their good will, were totally 
lJ Bunau-Varilla, Panama, P• 360. 
14 Miner, Fight for the Panama Route, P• 375. 
-
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ignorant of the ways of the politicians in Washington. 
Their presence could cause trouble and"• •• facilitate 
the cultivation of personal ambitions of hostile political 
interests. 1115 
The other possible obstacle was the Reyes mission on 
/ 
its way from Bogata. Apparently ignorant of the rebuff of 
Reyes, Bunau-Varilla considered it imperative that both 
missions be presented with definitive and accomplished 
facts. "Success was more than ever the price of rapidity of 
movement."16 
On November 15 Hay sent to Bunau-Varilla a proposed 
draft which was the Hay-Herran Treaty with insignificant 
changes. As the presidential election was near, Bunau-
Varilla realized that there must be no cor troversial points 
or the Democrats in Congress could muster enough votes to 
defeat the treaty. 
The only things that Bunau-Varilla was determined to 
defend were (1) the principles of neutrality, (2) the 
equality of passage from the point of charges and conditions 
of transit, (3) an indemnity to Panama equal to that offered 
to Colombia, and (4) the protection of Panama. 17 
l5 Bunau-Varilla, Panama, P• 367. 
1.6 Ibid. 
i 7 Ibid., P• 368. 
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By way of compensation Bunau-Varilla decided to ex-
tend widely the share of sovereignty attributed to the 
United States which had been granted in the Hay-Herran 
Treaty. To cut short any debate in the Senate, he decided 
to grant a concession en bloc. 
The new proposal was returned to Hay on November 16 
with an accompanying letter which made it clear that Bunau-
Varilla was willing to accept either proposal which Hay pre-
ferred. The letter ended, "I take the liberty of repeating 
that this new form is simply a suggestion to enable you to 
decide. Your decision will be my pleasure. 1118 
Failing to see the Secretary, Bunau-Varilla sent a 
letter to Hay which clearly enumerated his position on the 
two proposals. The pertinent passage of +he letter stated: 
If you find justified the spirit which inspired these 
suggestions I am ready to sign the Treaty either under 
the form presented to you this morning or under the old 
form. The old form has the advantage of rendering easier 
the comparison between the Treaty with Colombia and the 
Treaty with Panama, and to show the progress made from 
one to the other. But it has the great disadvantage of 
bearing the trace of a long diplomatic fight with Mo 
Concha, who never wished to accede to anything in one 
article without withdrawing it in the next. 
The new form has the advantage of conferring upon the 
United States in broad and general terms the rights she 
is entitled to have; rendering it thus unnecessary to 
enumerate in an infinity of cas particuliers what right 
Colombia was generous enough to grant.19 
lB Ibid., P• 370. 
l9 Ibido 
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In a letter to his daughter, Mrs. Payne Whitney, Hay 
described the negotiations with Bunau-Varilla giving him-
self much more credit than was his due. He stated, "• •• 
I went over my project line for line, and fought out every 
section of it; adopted a few good suggestions ••• sent 
for Varilla, went over the whole treaty with him, explained 
all the changes, got his consent,. and at seven o'clock signed 
1120 the momentous document • . . 
During the course of a conference between Hay and 
Bunau-Varilla, it was disclosed that there was strong sena-
torial support for a plan to divide the $10,000,000 compen-
sation between Colombia and Panama. Bunau-Varilla, realizing 
the unfavorable reception this plan would have in Panama, 
argued strongly against it. He pointed 011t that a payment 
to Colombia would be interpreted by the world in general 
and the Latin-American countries in particular as the United 
States' acting in bad faith by an 11 ••• insulting offer of 
a little money compensation for a patriotic wrong. 1121-
The proposal was dropped, the treaty was signed on 
November 18. The text was basically the one proposed by 
20 Hay to Mrs. Payne Whitney, his daughter, November 
19, 1903, as quoted in William Roscoe Thayer, The Life and 
Letters of John Hay (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 19'I;T,'" p. 318. 
2l Bunau-Varilla, Panama, P• 372-75. 
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Bunau-Varills. By the terms of this treaty the United 
States was given 11 ••• in perpetuity the use, occupation 
and control" of a strip of land ten miles wide, extending 
from either coast a distance of three miles. The cities of 
Panama and Colon, which lay within this zone, were specif-
ically excluded from control by the United States. In ad-
dition to this grant, the islands in the Bay of Panama, 
named Perico, Naos, Culebra, and Flaraenco, were also given 
to the United States in perpetuity. In case the zone thus 
granted was insufficient, the treaty granted, in addition,, 
sufficient land outside the zone "which may be necessary and 
convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, 
sanitation and protection of the said Canal. 1122 As compared 
to the Hay-Herran Treaty, which granted a strip of land ten 
kilometers and excluded the islands in the Bay of Panama, 
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was a liberal concession on the 
part of Panama. 
Article III, which incorporated the most significant 
change, provided for: 
22 William M. Malloy (comp.), Treaties, Conventions, 
International Acts, Protocols and A reements between the 
United States and other Powers-;-T77 - 9 • Vols. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1910, P• 09-616. Hereinafter 
cited as Malloy, Treaties. See also Diplomatic History of 
the Panama Canal. Senate Documents, No. 474, P• 295-3030 
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grants to the United States of all the rights, power and 
authority within the zone mentioned ••• which the United 
States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign 
of the territory within which such lands and waters are 
located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the 
Republic of P~nama of any such sovereign rights, power 
or authority. 3 
By this article one of the principal points of dis-
pute of the Hay-Herran Treaty was prevented. By giving to 
the United States such sovereignty, the question of tribu-
nals was eliminated as all cases of law would be settled by 
courts established by the United States. 
The compensation for these grants to the United 
States was provided for in Article I which stated that "The 
United States guarantees and will maintain the independence 
of the Republic of Panama." 
The pecuniary compensation remained identical to that 
of the Hay-Herran Treaty in that it provided for a payment 
of $10,000,000 on exchange of ratification and an annual 
payment of $250,000 beginning nine years after ratification. 
The way was also cleared for the French Canal Company to 
transfer its properties and interest to the United States. 
Article XXIII granted to the United States unequivo-
cal rights ". • • to employ armed forces for the safety and 
protection of the Canal ••• " and when it became necessary 
to"• •• use its police and its land and navy fo1ces or to 
establish fortif'ications for these purposes. 11 Panama was 
23 Ibid., Senate Doc. 474, p. 296;_ Malloy, Treaties, 
p. 610. 
given the right to transport its"• •• vessels and troop 
and munitions of war in such vessels at all times without 
paying charges of any kind." 
The treaty as signed on November 18, 1903, had a 
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stormy path ahead before ratification on February 23, 1904. 
The opponents of the Panama route were still hopeful that 
there was a chance of defeating the treaty and making pos-
sible the adoption of the Nicaraguan route. These forces 
were again led by Senator Morgan, who systematically pointed 
out the weaknesses of the treaty. His speech before the 
Senate on February 20 fills ten and one-half pages of the 
Congressional Record. Speaking in general terms of the events 
in Panama and the proposed treaty, Senator Morgan stated: 
I have heard nothing in our history that seems to 
require more studious and careful consideration than 
the treaty now before the Senate. The situation it 
creates seems easy, because we are strong, but it is 
like the first attack of a fatal malady that no physical 
strength can resist. It is a moral delinquency that 
indicates a deep-rooted national sin that in the end 
"will find us out . 11 24-
Becoming more specific, he stated that: 
We cannot limit our people or those of Panama by such 
a ratification, because one of the signatory powers w~s 
not, in fact, a government organized by any law •• • 2j 
24 Senator Morgan, Cong. Rec., 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
Vol. 38, (1904), P• 2121. 
25 Ibid. 
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• • • According to the recitals in this treaty we are 
dealing with the Republic of Panama, and in its first 
announcement of its recognition as a government, which 
was made by Secretary Hay to the Goverrunent of Colombia, 
he stated that Panama was a government republican in 
form. If the facts have been stated, even this diplo-
matic euphemism would fail to show that any organized 
government existed in Panama when this treaty ~as signed, 
and much less that it was republican in form.26 
Senator Morgan's arguments against the treaty were 
concentrated mainly with degrading Panama, its goverrunent, 
and its people. Morgan apparently had little respect for 
the people or their morals. It was his fear that any com-
plaint a gainst any vice or political enterprise, either in 
the Republic or in the canal zone, or an effort "to suppress 
gambling or the resorts of the liquor dealers or thieves, 
the patriotism of those classes will at once be kindled into 
violent resentment, and their love for Colombian liberties 
will lead to efforts to return to the fatherland. 112 7 
Article III of the treaty was especially attacked by 
the vituperative Senator, as he was very skeptical that the 
granting of sovereignty to the United States might produce 
the desired effects. It was his belief that to 
••• sanction such a lapse of the sovereignty of Panama, 
or the merger of its sovereignty in another state or 
confederation, is an invitation to such action that 
those fickle people, to whom revolution is a pastime, 
8 will be sure to accept even on the slightest occasion.2 




After methodically attacking the remaining articles 
of the treaty, Morgan struck at Bunau-Varilla. Not only did 
he leave no doubt as to his private opinions of the French-
man, but he also questioned his authority to sign the treaty 
as the 
••• credentials and full powers of M. Bunau-Varilla as 
the Panama negotiator are disputed by Senators in their 
places, as not being sufficient to make this treaty. 
The Committee on Foreign Relations, by vote, called 
upon the Secretary of State for a copy of these powers, 
and he declined to furnish them to the committee, and 
thereupon, after the lapse of several days, the committee 
rescinded its resolution.29 
It was an easy step for Morgan to switch from his 
attack on Bunau-Varilla to the activities of the New Panama 
Canal Company. He charged that the lobbyists and lawyers 
had the"• •• power and audacity to push their demands into 
the most reserved counsels of government." He continued that 
what"• •• they had to sell is the same that a person some-
times sells to doctors--his body for post-mortem use on the 
dissecting table. 11 3° In this biting comment he was referring 
to the partly finished canal that the French company had 
begun. He also expressed amazement that Senator Spooner was 
aghast that the company should live up to its contract agree-
ments by failing to finish the project as stipulated in the 
concessions ma.de to the French by Colombia and then selling 
29 Ibid.,p. 2125. 
30 Ibid., P• 2128. 
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its interests to the United States. 
It was his conviction that the pressure being put on 
the Senate for prompt ratification without amendment did 
• o • not come from Panama, but from those who are ma-
nipulating the demands of the New Panama Canal Company 
and the holders of its stocks and the bonds of the old 
company in syndicate that have bought them for a song 
in times ~hen their prospective value was greatly de-
pressed.Ji 
Senator Morgan did not confine his attacks on Hay 
and Bunau-Varilla to the Senate but used various religious 
pamphlets for his attacks. However lucid and biting these 
attacks were, the Senator was by no means free from error 
and self-contradictions. A letter from Morgan to President 
H. S. Pritchett of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
was shown to Secretary Hay. In reply to this letter, Hay 
did much to refute the charges made by },organ . Speaking of 
Morgan, Hay described him as being 
••• in such a state of mind in regard to the canal that 
if you should answer everything he said, categorically 
contradicting him with his own public utterances, it 
would have no effect on him. 
As he admits ••• he is as much the author of the 
present canal treaty as I am. Not only did I embody in 
it all his amendments to the Herran treaty, but I went 
further than he has ever done in getting the proper 
guarantees for jurisdiction over the canal. A year ago 
he wrote ••• denouncing the Government of Colombia as 
the sum of all inequities, and saying that we were vio-




Government of Colombia against the Li berals of Panama , 
insisting that it was our burden duty to aid them in 
attaini ng the i r liberty . How can y ou argue with a man 2 whose prejudices are so violent and so variable as this?3 
Senator Hanna, who had led the fight for the Spooner 
bill, died on February 16, 1904, leaving Senators John c. 
Spooner, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Shelby Cullom to carry on 
the fight for the treaty . Senator Spooner carried the brunt 
of the attack , and a more able debator would have been hard 
to find. However degrading for the people of Panama the 
attacks of Senator Morgan may have been, Spooner defended 
them, their government , and the revolution as though it 
were his personal crusade . His exuberance in defending the 
revolution, although his speeches were concerned more with 
rhetoric than with fact, had a moving effect on the most 
staunch opponents of the convention. Spooner contended that 
no revolution was more justifiable than the one in Panama . 
As to the charges that it was carried out merely for a canal, 
he stated it would be necessary to 
••• close the eyes to the long history of misrule, 
violence, tyranny , and robbery. It is to forget that 
without regard to a canal long ago, but for us, the 
people of the Isthmus of Panama would have become 
independent . 33 
32 William Roscoe Thayer (ed. and comp . ), "John Hay 
and the Panama Republic, " Harpers Magazine , CXXXI (July, 
191.5), P• 17.5• 
33 Cong . Rec . , 58th Cong ., 2nd Sess . , Vol . 38, P • 2137 . 
90 
The haste with which the government in Washington 
acted was regrettable, but President Roosevelt apparently 
could not be restrained. It was this very haste which was 
responsible in part for the severe criticism which was soon 
concentrated on him. His orders to prevent the landing of 
Colombian troops within fifty miles of the Isthmus was un-
doubtedly an undue exercise of power . Although some might 
maintain that the United States had implied powers to inter-
fere, as they had done so many times in the past, to con-
struct and protect the free transit across the Isthmus, the 
treaty of 1846, which was still in effect, ,;as violated by 
our action th re. 
Be that as it may, Senator Spooner did not hesitate 
to defend the actions of the President. Anparently trying to 
base his arguments on international law, he stated that the 
United States' recognition of Panama"• •• was a recognition 
of a fact, for , from the standpoint of international law, 
independence is a fact . 11 34 
In this vein he continued: 
The President's actions in recognizing on the 6th of 
November the independence of the Republic of Panama by 
entering into relations with it was not only within his 
power, but was strictly in accordance with the settled 
principles of international law upon the subject. On 
that date there no longer remained--and no one can 
34 Ibid . 
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challenge this statement--a vestige of Colombian author-
ity or power on the Isthmus of Panama. The Colombian 
troops which had been sent there had sailed away . 3~ 
No one can deny the fact that the troops had "sailed 
away," but Senator Spooner failed to give reasons for their 
abrupt departure . Students of international law may agree 
that the United States might not have been guilty of vio-
lating the letter of the law, but it is a feeble excuse for 
violating the spirit. Then the question arises whether or 
not it would be possible for a powerful nation to violate 
this spirit since it is those countries that determine what 
is right . Might makes right. 
Perhaps the Senator had this in the back of his mind 
in putting forth his defense of the actions of his govern-
ment, as he based his arguments on what ~r~ s right. All the 
criticism was due to the fact that a canal was involved. 
Otherwise 
• •• it would have been in harmony with what has been 
done before, without criticism ••• why should it be 
criticised because when liberty came at last to that 
people and independence and a power to conserve the edu-
cation of their children and the happiness of themselves 
it brought also a term; nation of the partnership between 
this country and Bogata and tender of gejgrous terms for 
the opening of a canal so vital to them? 
35 ~ • , P • 2140 . 
36 Ibid. , P • 2139 • 
q ") 
At this point in following Mr . Spooner ' s lin oi' 
reasoning, Senator Tillman raised the question that if the 
Panama people were so downtrodden and oppressed or such sub-
jects of sympathy, why did the United States wait until 
after the Hay-Herran Treaty had been rejected by Colombia. 
before realizing their true state of affairs . 17 S no.tor 
Spooner could only admit that the United States had h · lped 
to "fasten shackles" and maintain tyranny over Pano.ma af\ 
long as there was a possibility of working out an U/jreement 
with Colombia . 
At last they revolted and created a situation wh re 
they--the provisional government--wer0 the only govel"ning 
body on the Isthmus. Thus, in refutine; the chm·ges of 
Morgan that they were not a government, t hey established a 
republican government and set about the formation of a 
constitution. And when time for recognition of the now 
republic came, the 11 • • • President found a republic well 
established , (and) with every reason in the world tor ,ard 
it as a stable government . 11 38 This establishment of the 
stable government took only three days . 
Party discipline , strengthened by the approach of a 
presidential campaign, was enforced to bring the wav r·ing 
37 Ibid., P• 2143 . 
38 ~ -
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senators into line. On February 23, 1904, the Senate ad-
vised the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty by 
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a vote of sixty-six to fourteen. The preceding debate over 
the convention was heated and largely followed party lines 
until the final vote was taken. Long and stormy as the 
debate over the treaty and the recognition of the new 
Panamanian government may have been, the crux of the debate 
was embodied in a statement of Senator Tillman of South 
Carolina. 
The Senator (Spooner) has made them (the Colombians) 
out a heap mangier lot than I have ever said or t h ought. 
Therefore, the Senator can not say that I am undertaking 
to defend that tyranny over Panama. I do not. I simply 
object to the manner in ~hich the United States has 
dealt with this matter.3 
If the opposition to the treaty was based on moral 
grounds in the United States, the major European powers were 
evidently not bothered with such scruples. It was at once a 
case of material interests over moral issues. The Associated' 
Press, under the date line of November 6, 1903, revealed that 
the European powers approved of the policy of the United 
States. "The restoration of order on the Isthmus was long 
desired by the European powers, and the United States, by 
restoring this order and maintaining it, was actually doing 
Europe and their interests (presumably conrrnercial) a great 




The Frankfurter Zietung expressed the opinion that 
the United States instigated the revolution with the object 
of building the inter-oceanic canal. The Vassiche Zietung 
was in agreement with this theory but went a step further 
in asserting that Roosevelt waited two months after Colombia 
rejected the treaty without negotiating with Nicaragua be -
cause the United States found a more effective means of 
securing their ends by working behind the scenes . It was 
officially stated in Berlin that the only desire of Germany 
was to see the United States build the canal which would 
benefit German commerce and to provide protection for the 
Germans of Panama . 41 
The official attitude of German~~ was made known to 
Charlemagne Tower, United States minister to Germany, upon 
the occasion of a rumor that Colombian citizens had pe-
titioned their government to express thanks to Germany for 
its offer of protection. In answer to these rumors, Mr. 
Tower wired that he had 
••• just received the assurances of the German minister 
for foreign affairs that there is no truth whatever in 




this report. He added that Germany has no interest in 
the Panama matter, and that the question of an
4
~nter-
ference on the part of Germany does not exist. 
This feeling was also apparent in Great Britain where 
the official attitude was that the affairs in Panama were 
entirely the business of the United States. This comparative 
apathy appeared in all diplomatic quarters in London, and 
except in the unlikely possibility of outside interference, 
no action was contemplated by the British. So far as the 
Associated Press was concerned, the foreign embassies in 
London were of the same opinion.43 
If general approval of the happenings in Panama was 
apparent in Germany and Great Britain, the French attitude 
was much less restrained in showing its approvalo The 
reasons for this sympathetic understand~~g were more than 
apparent. With $40,000,000 hanging in the balance, who 
could deny the French peasants their due return on the 
money they had invested. The French approval of the actions 
of the United States was revealed in a telegram from the 
United States minister in Paris. In conversations with the 
French foreign minister, a very sympathetic manner was ex-
pressed. The feeling was not confined to official circles 
42 Charlemagne Tower, minister to Germany, to Hay, 
November 10, 1903, A.S.P., F.R. (1904), P• 244. 
43 Topeka Daily Capital, November 6, 1903, P• 2. 
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as the"• •• French generally are much pleased with events 
in Panama and our attitude there . 1144 One possible reason 
for the friendliness which existed in France toward the 
American construction and control of the canal was due to 
the attitude of the Paris newspaper Le Matin . This news-
paper, which was influential and had an excellent reputa-
tion in France, was owned principally by Bunau-Varilla 1 s 
brother and Bunau-Varilla himself was a large stockholder . 45 
Official recognition would follow as soon as the United 
States made public its recognition of the new republic . 46 
This feeling did not extend to Colombia, as once the 
revolution became a fact the former mother country tried to 
recoup the position she forwerly held . A session of the 
Council of Ministers was called , and declaring war on the 
United States was considered . However, cooler heads prevailed; 
this action was decided against , and Colombia resorted to 
44 Horace Porter (minister to France) to Hay, November 
11 , 190 3., A. S . P . , F . R. ( 1904) , P • 306 • 
45 Hale, Review of Reviews, p . 679 . 
46 Porter to Hay , November 11, 1903, A. S . P., F . R. 
(1904), P • 245 . Apparently feeling as though they must show 
their appreciation to the protector of he French peasants ' 
money., the French government"• •• animated by the desire 
to show to your G<~ellency lts high appreci~tion, not only 
of your merit s a statesman and scholar, but also of the 
service rendered by you, durine your administration, in de-
voting your efforts to the maintenance of the peace of the 
world has decided to confer on 1rour excellency the di nity 
of th; Grnnd Cross of the National Order of the Le_:ion of' 




diplomatic means in an effort to regain her former possession 
of Panama . 
General Rafael Reyes was elected president of Colombia 
on July L~, 1904, and he promptly announced support of a con-
ciliatory policy. He felt that war between the two nations 
was out of the question, and as arbitration had been de -
clined, he, therefore, submitted"• •• a few remarks on 
your excellency's position in regard to my request that the 
pending differences be referred to the Hague tribunal . 1147 
This request fell on deaf ears, and Hay replied that 
the United States could see no reason to"• • • reconsider 
its attitude in these matters, which has be en adopted after 
mature deliberation and reflection . 1148 
Whatever the merits of the controversy, desire to 
restore harmony between the two nations soon became evident . 
Secretary of State Elihu Root visited several Latin-American 
nations at the time of the Third Pan-American Conference , 
and stopping at Cartagena on his way home, he worked out an 
agreement which later beca..me the basis of a formal protocol 
signed on August 17, 1907 . 49 
47 General Rafael Reyes (president of Colombia to Hay, 
January 11, A. S . P., F . R. (1904 ), P • 311 
48 Hay to Reyes, January 13, A. S . P ., F . R. (1904), 
p . 313 . 








the"• •• Government of the United States of America may 
intervene in any part of the Republic of Panama to reestab-
lish public peace and constitutional order in the event of 
their being disturbed. 11 5]. 
Examination of this article clearly indicates that 
the United States might wield considerable influence in 
both the domestic and international affairs of the republic. 
This has been the case many times as "Intervention (by the 
United States) has occurred . at times without any request on 
the part of the local government, and at other times in 
response to more or less formal appea1. 11 52 
The policy provisions of the treaty under which the 
United States might assume the responsibility of maintaining 
order in Panama, Colon, and adjacent arers in case, in the 
judgment of the United States, Panama was unable to maintain 
order, has been a matter of recurring disagreement. Panama 
was of the opinion that the United States might interfere 
only after a disturbance occurred while it was the conten-
tion of the United States that it ha.d the right to assume 
preventative measures . 
In 1905 the party out of power in Panama raised the 
51 A.S.P., F.R. (1906), Part 2, P• 1203-4• 
52 R. L. Buell, "Panama and the United States," 
Foreign Policy Reports, VII (1932), P• 409-426. 
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question of whether or not the United States would support 
a revolution against a dictator. Secretary Root felt that 
action would be determined by circumstances. He held that 
the United States had the right of intervention if the in-
dependence of Panama was threatened • .53 The opposition party 
of 1905 demanded that the United States supervise the votins 
to assure a fair election. The United States was at first 
indisposed to act. But finally upon the request of the 
Panamanian Government a commission was sent to cooperate 
with a similar Panamanian body to supervise the election.54 
A similar occurrence happened in 1912, again at the request 
of the Panama Government, which in this case was justified 
under Article 136 of the Constitution.55 These practices 
did not fail to arouse bitter criticirrn, however, on the 
part of many of the people of Panama. 
In 1910 a treaty between Panama and Costa Rica ac-
cepted the Pacific boundary but submitted the Atlantic 
boundary settlement to the arbitration of Chief Justice E. 
D. White of the United States Supreme Court. Handed down on 
September 12, 1914, his decision on the whole supported the 
Costa Rican claims. Panama remained unsatisfied and, in 1921, 
53 A.S.P., F.R. (1906), Part 2, P• 1205. 
5!t Ibid., 1905, translation from the Panama Journal, 
November 8--;-!904, P• 717-719. 
55 Ibid., 1912, P• 1139-1141. 
-
101 
hostilities broke out between the two countries. 
In March, 1921, the United States insisted that the 
guarantee of independence of Pana.ma was conditioned on its 
observance of international obligations and urged accep-
tance of the White decision. Pana.ma finally yielded but 
only after the United States had sent a battleship and 400 
marines to the Isthmus.56 
The other major problem in Panamanian foreign re-
lations dealt with the rights of the Canal Zone and the 
relations of the two countries in time of war. Article III 
of the treaty of 1904 granted to the United States, in the 
area in which the canal was constructed, 11 all the rights, 
power and authority" which it would possess "if it were the 
sovereign of the territory." Although th0se words seem 
explicit, they were subject to various interpretations. 
Panama became a member of the League of Nations, and 
by Article XII of the covenant, was bound to submit all 
disputes which might lead her to war to an inquiry or arbi-
tration and was obliged not to resort to war until three 
months after a decision had been reached. This was in 
almost direct opposition to the treaty of 1903, as, with the 
close association of the two governments in the canal enter-
prise, it would be almost impossible for Panama to remain at 
56 Buell, Foreign Policy Reports, P• 410-4110 
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peace if the United States were drawn into war. 
Under these conditions it was apparent that a new 
agreement was needed to replace that of 1903. A new pact 
was drawn in 1936 but failed ratification by the United 
States Senate. The main difficulty arose in connection with 
Article X, which provided for consultation between the two 
countries before either of them could take measures to safe-
guard their interests if these measures affected territory 
under the jurisdiction of the other. Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles arranged for an exchange of notes which left 
no possibility of misunderstanding. The pertinent passage 
of these notes stated that: 
••• in the event of an emergency so sudden as to make 
action of a preventive character imperative to safeguard 
the neutrality of the Panama Canal, nd if by reason of 
such an emergency it would be impossible to consult with 
the Government of Panama as provided in Article X of 
said treaty, the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica need not dela~ action to meet this emergency pending 
consultation ••• ~7 
The United States Senate voted ratification of the 
treaty on July 26, 1939, and by its conclusion it gave 
promise that the relations between the Panamanian Government 
and the authorities of the Canal Zone and the United States 
would become more cordial. 
57 A.S.P., F.R., Vol. II (1939), P• 197. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
A canal across the Isthmus of Central America was a 
conscious part of the policy of the American people from 
the time this country began to develop its world commerce. 
This consciousness was slow in beginning, for as long as 
the British fleet was able to supply us with the necessary 
imports, the general public was concerned chiefly with find-
ing their destinies within their own borders and, when 
occasion permitted, forcing those borders further west, 
north, and south. 
With the advent of the Rooseveltian imperialism and 
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's new theorie~ of sea power, 
the nation realized their isolated position and began "look-
ing outward." A modern navy was forming, and maritime 
services were growing in proportion to the wealth and power 
of the country. Trade potentials of the Far East were 
greatly coveted, and as a large percentage of the trade was 
carried on through eastern ports, the long voyage around 
Cape Horn became particularly irksome. 
The United States had the wealth and power to cut the 
Isthmus, but various estoppels prevented the undertaking 
until the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty cleared the way of all 




follow as a result of ou~ actions on the Isthmus, but these 
did not stop the actual construction of the canal. Under 
the direction of Major-General George w. Goethals, unprece-
dented obstacles were surmounted with a competence that 
gradually silenced the most severe critics. Year by year 
the low hills of the continental divide crumbled under the 
steady assault of the engineers and laborers . The dam at 
Gatun was raised; the intricate mechanisms of the locks were 
set in place; and the once unruly waters of the Charges were 
harnessed to serve world commerce. 
The canal was opened to traffic on August 15, 1914. 
A brief review of traffic from its opening indicates that, 
starting with a total of 1,058 transits in 1915, there was 
a gradual growth of traffic which reached a total of 6,289 
in 1929, the peak year up to 1939 . During 1929 there was 
an average of 17 . 2 transits per day with total tolls of 
$27,111,125 and a total cargo of 30,647,768 tons. During 
the depression years and subsequent diminished world trade, 
traffic declined. However, it gradually rose so that by 1939 
the toll surpassed the year for 1929 and stood at $27,866,627. 
Between the years of 1915 and 1939, a total of 104, 417 ships 
passed through the canal with total tolls of $453,046,857.91 . 1 
1 Figures taken from the Annual Report of the Gover-
nor of the Panama Canal for the Fiscal Year Ended June JQ, 
1939----C-Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940T;p. -:5"- 9 . 
-
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During the years following World War II, the economic 
situation in Panama gave rise to demands there for a greater 
share of the profits from the canal. Negotiations were be-
gun in 1953 for a revision of the agreement between the 
United States and Panama. On January 25, 1955, the new 
agreement was signed at Panama City; it not only raised the 
annuity from $430 ,000 to $1,930,000, but also ended the pro-
tectorate of this country over Panama. The monopoly by the 
United States over construction, maintenance, and operation 
of trans-Isthmean railroads and highways was abrogated. 
The control of sanitary conditions in Panama City and Colon 
was returned to Panama, along with all lands which were not 
directly connected to the operation of the canal. In re-
turn the United States was granted a fift9en year lease for 
a military training area in the province of Coche with an 
option for renewal. 
Critics will long debate the merits of the Panama 
route and the Nicaraguan route, and probably no definite 
conclusions will ever be reached. The moral aspects of the 
long and tedious negotiations and actions will be as hotly 
debated with even less chance of conclusiveness. While 
debates will continue, the fact remains that the Panama Canal 
stands as a monument to Roosevelt, Hay, Bunau-Varilla, Hanna, 
Lodge, Mahan, and the many others who had the courage to 
fight for a project which has bestowed immeasurable benefits 
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to modern civilization. 
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